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I. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 
What is called “the nonprofit sector”1 includes a wide variety of 
organizations whose diversity can be glimpsed, though not fully 
appreciated, by the list of organizations that may be recognized by 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as exempt from taxation 
under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.2  This list includes 
religious, health care, charitable, and similar organizations; social 
welfare organizations; business leagues like a chamber of 
commerce; social and recreation clubs, for example, a country 
club; labor and agriculture organizations; fraternal beneficiary 
societies or associations; and numerous other kinds of 
organizations.3  As with any sector with myriad organizations, 
considerable further diversity would be apparent if the 
organizations were grouped according to their budgets or revenues 
and expenditures, their assets, number of paid employees, number 
of volunteers, or amount of contributions or grants.4  According to 
the Urban Institute, public charities, or ones exempt pursuant to § 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, “accounted for 63 percent 
of registered nonprofits in 2008 and 59 percent of reporting 
nonprofits,” grew sixty-one percent in number from 1998 to 2008, 
and “reported $1.4 trillion in revenue and $2.6 trillion in assets in 
2008.”5  A large number of these are “small charities.”  Nearly 
half—forty-five percent—reported annual expenses of less than 
$100,000, and another 28.9% reported expenses between $100,000 
 
 1. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
2 (4th ed. 2010); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 23 
(10th ed. 2011).  The “nonprofit sector” is known by various other adjectives, 
including “tax-exempt, voluntary, nongovernmental, [and] independent.”  Id. at 
24 (italics omitted). 
 2. Internal Revenue Code § 501(a) provides, “An organization described in 
subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this 
subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.”  I.R.C. § 
501(a) (2006).  Subsection (c) lists twenty-nine such organizations.  Id. § 501(c).  
 3. Id. 
 4. See generally KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 139–236 
(2008) (exploring the size, scope, and finances of some nonprofit organizations).  
The Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. conducts and publishes in-depth 
research, including The Nonprofit Almanac 2008, analyzing and evaluating the 
nonprofit sector.  Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, URBAN INST., 
http://www.urban.org/center/cnp/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). 
 5. Kennard T. Wing et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, 
and Volunteering, 2010, URBAN INST., at 2 (2010), http://www.urban.org 
/UploadedPDF/412209-nonprof-public-charities.pdf. 
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and $499,999.6 
The nonprofit sector has been characterized as “a growth 
industry,”7 and in a similar vein, another authority writes that the 
nonprofit sector and the federal tax law governing it “have a 
common feature: enormous and incessant growth.”8  Data 
compiled by the IRS confirms such growth and indicates that as of 
the end of 2009 the number of tax-exempt organizations and 
nonexempt charitable trusts approached two million.9  That figure 
does not include churches and other religious organizations 
because they are not required to apply for recognition of tax 
exemption or file annual returns,10 nor does it include any 
organization claiming tax-exempt status that “normally does not 
have more than $5,000 annually in gross receipts.”11  It would also 
not include thousands, perhaps “hundreds of thousands,”12 of 
unincorporated nonprofit associations, which may, but typically do 
not, file a Form 1023 and seek recognition as a tax-exempt 
 
 6. Id. at 2–3. 
 7. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 12. 
 8. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 23. 
 9. For the years 2006–2009, respectively, the IRS reported 1,726,491; 
1,789,554; 1,855,067; and 1,912,695 tax-exempt organizations and nonexempt 
charitable trusts.  I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 55B, 2009 DATA 
BOOK 56 (2009) [hereinafter IRS 2009 DATA BOOK], available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf.  In June of 2011, the IRS revoked the tax 
exemptions of 275,000 nonprofit organizations because they had not filed 
required information returns for three consecutive years.  See Stephanie Strom, 
I.R.S. Ends Exemptions for 275,000 Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at B3.  
Approximately a quarter of these were recognized as tax-exempt prior to 1980, 
and an analysis conducted by the Urban Institute concluded that “[w]hile it may 
be tempting to attribute the failing of these organizations to the recession, it is 
more likely that these organizations have been out of operation for many years.”  
Amy S. Blackwood & Katie L. Roeger, Revoked: A Snapshot of Organizations That Lost 
Their Tax-Exempt Status, URBAN INST., at 2 (Aug. 2011), http://www.urban.org 
/url.cfm?ID=412386.  A number of these nonprofit organizations, however, may 
simply not have understood the obligation to file despite efforts by the IRS to 
notify affected nonprofits.  Strom, supra at B3.  These organizations may reapply 
for recognition as tax-exempt.  Id.  In any event, for now, the number of nonprofit 
organizations was reduced accordingly.  Id. 
 10. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(i)–(ii) 
(2010); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR 
YOUR ORGANIZATION 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p557.pdf. 
 11. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR 
YOUR ORGANIZATION 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p557.pdf; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(iii). 
 12. REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT, Prefatory Note 
(2008) [hereinafter RUUNAA]. 
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organization. 
Of particular interest, and the focus of this article, are those 
nonprofit organizations that are recognized as tax-exempt under § 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.13  First, there is the sheer 
number of such organizations and the growth that number 
represents.  There are more than 1.2 million nonprofit 
organizations that are exempt from taxation under this section, 
representing growth by nearly half in the last decade.14   
Second is the nature of these organizations and the fact that 
they are characterized by a public mission—religious, educational, 
or charitable, with a focus on the community or the public—and 
are not driven by the prospect or goal of personal financial profit.  
That, of course, is the dominant, defining characteristic of the 
nonprofit sector and particularly the 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization—the “non-distribution constraint”15 that commands, 
in the words of § 501(c)(3), that “no part of the net earnings . . . 
[may inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.”16  It is not that they cannot engage in business in 
furtherance of exempt purposes—they can—or that they cannot 
 
 13. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) provides: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), 
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate 
for public office. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 14. According to the IRS 2009 Data Book, 1,238,201 of the 1,912,695 
reported tax-exempt organizations and non-charitable trusts, or sixty-five percent, 
were 501(c)(3) organizations.  IRS 2009 Data Book, supra note 9, at 56; Giving USA 
2011: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2010, GIVING USA FOUNDATION 
19 (2011), http://www.givingusareports.org/products/GivingUSA_2011 
_ExecSummary_Print.pdf (reporting that as of 2010 there were 1,280,739 
501(c)(3) organizations, representing a forty-eight percent increase over the 
865,096 such organizations in 2001).  These numbers include private foundations.  
 15. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 497, 501–02, 595–96 (1981); Henry. B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838–40 (1980). 
 16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
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generate a “profit”—they often do.  It is that they must serve “a 
public rather than a private interest,”17 and “charity,” to give one 
example of a qualifying purpose, is defined or interpreted very 
broadly in a way that explicitly conveys the importance and value of 
the work of these organizations to our society and to government at 
all levels.18 
Third, organizations that are recognized as tax-exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3) not only are not required to pay income and other 
taxes,19 but donors to such organizations can receive a charitable 
deduction from adjusted gross income on which they would 
otherwise have to pay tax.20  While the favorable tax treatment of 
501(c)(3) organizations can certainly be justified for the benefits 
they offer, it is beyond clear that such treatment also comes at some 
cost to society in the form of foregone tax revenues, and perhaps in 
notions of fairness, which must necessarily underlie any tax system 
expecting and entitled to public support,21 especially when there is 
widespread concern over national budget deficits and the 
economy.  It is also true that there have been abuses and cases of 
questionable conduct by those responsible for directing or 
operating nonprofit organizations22 that have prompted extensive 
 
 17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011). 
 18. Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) provides, in part, that 
the term “charity” includes:  
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement 
of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or 
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the 
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by 
organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to 
lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and 
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or 
(iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.   
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (2011). 
 19. Ordinarily, but not always, an organization that is not required to pay 
federal taxes will also receive an exemption at the state and local levels from the 
obligation to pay state income, property, and sales taxes. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 1, at 440–45. 
 20. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). 
 21. See, e.g., Editorial, It’s Time for Tax Law Changes for Nonprofits, DES MOINES 
REG., July 25, 2011 (reporting avoidance of unrelated business income tax by the 
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, decrying that “[n]onprofit hospitals are not 
required by law to provide one penny of charity care or any defined amount of 
‘community benefit,’” and asserting that “[e]ntities that do not want to pay taxes 
should prove they are providing a public benefit that is worth the cost to everyone 
else”). 
 22. Prominent cases in the 1990s involved United Way, Adelphi University, 
and conversion or merger of nonprofit hospitals and health care providers to or 
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analysis of the nonprofit sector and rethinking of the legal 
requirements and expectations for exemption.23 
As a result, for several years now the IRS has emphasized good 
governance.  In a publication on the subject of governance and 
related topics,24 it stated: 
The IRS believes that a well-governed charity is more 
likely to obey the tax laws, safeguard charitable assets, and 
serve charitable interests than one with poor or lax 
governance.  A charity that has clearly articulated 
purposes that describe its mission, a knowledgeable and 
committed governing body and management team, and 
sound management practices is more likely to operate 
effectively and consistent with tax law requirements.  And 
while the tax law generally does not mandate particular 
management structures, operational policies, or 
administrative practices, it is important that each charity 
be thoughtful about the governance practices that are 
most appropriate for that charity in assuring sound 
operations and compliance with the tax law.  As a measure 
of our interest in this area, we ask about an organization’s 
governance, both when it applies for tax-exempt status 
and then annually as part of the information return that 
many charities are required to file with the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
The IRS then proceeded to discuss the role of mission, 
organizational documents, the governing body, governance and 
management policies, financial statements and reporting on Form 
 
into for-profit ventures.  See Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in 
Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (1993); Harvey J. 
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, 
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633–35 (1998).  For a recent 
listing of reported instances of misconduct, see FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, 
at 6–12. 
 23. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., REPORT ON EXEMPT STATUS REFORM 
(Discussion Draft 2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc 
/062204stfdis.pdf; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, 
Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Supplement to the Final Report 
to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, INDEP. SECTOR (Apr. 2006), http://www. 
independentsector.org/panel_supplement_redirect; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, 
Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A 
Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, INDEP. SECTOR (June 2005), 
http://www.independentsector.org/panel_final_report_redirect.  
 24. I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS –  
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege 
/governance_practices.pdf.  
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990, and transparency and accountability and their importance to 
the requirements of § 501(c)(3).25  Though speaking in terms of 
“governing boards” and mission and policies adopted by the “board 
of directors,” the IRS disavowed a mandate for a particular 
management structure.  
Structure of course is a function of the choice of form of 
organization that the organizers of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit make.  In 
fact, good governance practices may be and regularly are achieved, 
and not achieved, in every management structure.  What form to 
choose?  While the charitable trust form is an option and, for some, 
the unincorporated nonprofit association may be a viable choice, 
the “predominant” form of charitable organization in the United 
States is the nonprofit corporation.26  Nonprofit corporation law, 
like for-profit corporation law, is considerably more structured and 
detailed than unincorporated entity statutes.  For example, the 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (“MNCA”)27 deals with selection, 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 48–53.  A well-drafted charitable 
trust can accomplish much of what the corporate form would offer and is an 
available choice, but unlike England, it has not been as popular as the nonprofit 
corporation in the United States.  Id.; see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 200 cmts. c–d, at 5–7 (Council Draft No. 5, 2007).  Organizers 
of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit could choose to remain unincorporated, but if they later 
sought recognition as a tax-exempt organization, the “association” would have to 
elect to be taxed as a corporation and begin to observe formalities that 
unincorporated associations can avoid.  See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 7701(a) (2006).  
Moreover, at common law a number of problems beset the unincorporated 
association.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
addressed some of these in the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association 
Act (1996), adopted by twelve jurisdictions, and even more in the Revised Uniform 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008), which has been adopted so far 
in four jurisdictions.  RUUNAA (2008).  For some organizations—particularly a 
congregational faith for which incorporation and the mandate to have a board of 
directors with statutory authority is ill-suited to their faith—an unincorporated 
nonprofit association may be a viable and preferred choice.  Sarah J. Hastings, 
Cinderella’s New Dress: A Better Organizational Option for Churches and Other Small 
Nonprofits, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 813, 816–17, 843–47 (2007).  But many jurisdictions 
have not adopted these Uniform Acts, and many uncertainties, obstacles, and 
personal risks attend the choice of an unincorporated nonprofit association. 
 27. The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was developed and approved by 
the Committee on Nonprofit Corporations of the American Bar Association’s 
Section on Business Law.  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008) [hereinafter 
MNCA].  The first edition was promulgated in 1952, and that in turn was revised 
in 1987 and 2000 in the second edition.  Throughout its development there has 
been a consistent effort to track the Model Business Corporation Act where 
possible and appropriate.  See Lizabeth A. Moody, Foreword to MNCA, at xix–xxiv 
(3d ed. 2008). 
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resignation, and removal of directors, and their terms;28 meetings, 
action without a meeting, call and notice of meeting, waiver of 
notice, quorum, and voting;29 and officers’ duties, standards of 
conduct, resignation, and removal30 in considerably more detail 
than unincorporated entity statutes, if they deal with them at all.  
Many of these provisions have come to be enabling provisions, 
subject to individual nonprofit organizations’ choices in their 
articles and bylaws,  but as in all corporate law the prevailing wind 
is regulatory and mandatory unless permission otherwise is granted 
in the statute.  Moreover, other than provisions that enable or 
permit choice or variation, there is not the freedom to create and 
describe the organization and its processes in a way, for example, 
that unincorporated entity law presumes. 
In contrast to the corporation, in the business world the 
limited liability company, or LLC, has become the predominant 
choice of form in which to organize a business, and many more 
LLCs are being formed today than corporations.31  The reasons for 
that are commonly understood and widely appreciated.  The LLC 
provides its members with the limited liability shield of a 
corporation32 and the flow-through or conduit taxation for a 
partnership that means there is no tax at the entity level.33  
 
 28. MNCA § 8.04–.05, .07–.09. 
 29. Id. § 8.20–.24. 
 30. Id. § 8.41–.43. 
 31. The 2010 Annual Report of the Delaware Division of Corporations 
discloses that there were nearly three times the number of LLCs formed compared 
to corporations for the years 2008 (81,923 versus 29,501), 2009 (70,274 versus 
24,955), and 2010 (82,027 versus 28,181).  See DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2010), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf; Harry J. 
Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The Next Generation, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 83, 85 n.25 (2004) (stating that in 2002 in Wisconsin there were 18,132 
LLCs formed, compared to 5,752 corporations).  The experience in Iowa in 2009 
was similar, with 8,569 LLCs being formed compared to 2,734 corporations.  
Annual Report of Iowa, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS (2009), http://gavinm 
.com.c25.sitepreviewer.com/iaca/?country=USA&state=IA&section=BOS&print=tr
ue&year=2009.  See generally Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: 
An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed in the 
United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459 (2010). 
 32. E.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304 cmt. (2006) [hereinafter 
RULLCA]. 
 33. Under federal tax regulations popularly known as “check-the-box,” a 
single member LLC is a “disregarded entity,” while a multi-member LLC is 
presumed to be a partnership, resulting, in both cases, in no tax being imposed on 
or assessed to the LLC as an entity.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i) (2011); 
I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 8832, ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTION, 
8
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Moreover, LLC acts observe the characteristic right of 
unincorporated business associations that one chooses one’s co-
owners and, while economic rights are freely transferable, the 
transfer carries with it no management or information rights to the 
transferee.34  Significantly, LLC acts invariably represent “default” 
legislation allowing parties to create their arrangement and 
describe their deal as they want, stating explicitly that the Act 
governs only “[t]o the extent the operating agreement does not 
otherwise provide,” and providing further only a minimum number 
of provisions that cannot be varied.35 
The question arises whether the limited liability company is 
available as a form in which to organize a nonprofit organization, 
and specifically, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit.  It might be appropriate 
particularly for smaller charities,36 where flexibility contemplated 
by LLC legislation might reduce the burden and expense of 
observing formalities and allow those running the nonprofit to 
focus on mission and goals.  But is this form that was developed in 
the business context to shield private owners from personal liability 
and minimize taxes on earnings distributable to owners available in 
or sensible for the nonprofit world?  Does the LLC offer the 
structure or assurance of “a well-governed charity” that nonprofit 
law and the IRS require?  These questions implicate the purposes 
for which an LLC may be formed, the manner in which it is 
managed, the non-distribution constraint and control of assets, 
fiduciary duties, and the enforcement of fiduciary duties and 
protection of charitable assets.37  This article turns to an 
examination of these issues. 
II. THE LLC IN THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL WORLD:  
USE AND CONDITIONS 
In truth, the limited liability company is being used in the 
nonprofit organizational world and has been for many years.  First, 
in certain carefully prescribed circumstances, a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit can enter into a joint venture in the form of an LLC with 
a for-profit entity and not lose its exemption.  In Revenue Ruling 
 
CAT. NO. 22598R (2011) [hereinafter I.R.S. FORM 8832], available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.  
 34. See RULLCA §§ 501–502. 
 35. See id. § 110(b)–(c). 
 36. See Wing et al., supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
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98-15, the IRS determined that a charitable nonprofit organization 
could enter into a joint venture in the form of a limited liability 
company with a for-profit organization, without forfeiting its tax-
exempt status and ability to receive charitable contributions, 
provided that its participation was properly structured to further its 
exempt purposes.38  In its Revenue Ruling, the IRS described two 
situations, in one of which the exemption was preserved, while in 
the other it was lost.39  In the former situation a nonprofit 
operating an acute care hospital contributed all of its assets to a 
newly formed LLC that was going to be operated by the for-profit 
entity, which also contributed assets.40  The ownership interests of 
the two were proportional to their contributions; the articles of 
organization and operating agreement provided for a governing 
board consisting of three individuals chosen from the community 
by the 501(c)(3) nonprofit hospital and two selected by the for-
profit entity; the articles and operating agreement also required 
the board to operate the LLC in a manner furthering the 
charitable purposes of the nonprofit; and distributions were 
proportional to ownership interests.41  None of the nonprofit’s 
officers, directors, or key employees involved in the decision or 
planning was promised any employment or inducement or had any 
personal financial interest in the LLC.42  The nonprofit charitable 
health care mission would be fulfilled by the LLC, and it would 
utilize distributions it received to make grants “to support 
education and research and give resources to help provide health 
care to the indigent.”43  On these facts the IRS held that the 
nonprofit would continue to qualify as a 501(c)(3) organization 
when it formed the LLC with the for-profit entity.  A similar result 
may be achieved in a joint venture taking the form of an LLC 
where the joint venture activity is “ancillary” to the nonprofit’s 
primary operations but an insubstantial part of its total operations; 
 
 38. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718 [hereinafter Rev. Rul. 98-15].  These joint 
ventures are discussed and analyzed thoroughly in several leading sources.  See 
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND 
BUSINESS LAW ¶ 1.09 (1994 & Supp. 2011-1); HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 30.3; see also 
Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations: For Profits, Nonprofits, and 
Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 563 (2009). 
 39. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 38 (providing two situations to show when a 
nonprofit organization would or would not lose its tax exemption). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
10
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where attention is similarly paid to exempt purposes, structure, and 
control over assets and operations; and where there is assurance of 
proportionality in distributions.44 
Second, 501(c)(3) nonprofits regularly employ the device of a 
single member limited liability company to form a subsidiary that 
will hold property or operations that carry risk.  Imagine a 
nonprofit that owns and operates a number of nursing homes and 
care facilities in communities across the state.  Each carries 
predictable risks.  These risks can be isolated in one or more 
nonprofit LLC “subsidiaries,” and the parent nonprofit shielded 
from liability.  Or a donor may be prepared to contribute valuable 
real property to a nonprofit, but there is a risk of environmental 
claims.  The nonprofit can form an LLC to receive and hold the 
property, thus shielding itself from liability, but may report the 
property as an asset of its own on informational returns required by 
the IRS.45  For purposes of tax-exemption, under the “check-the-
box” regulations,46 the LLC formed by the nonprofit would be a 
“disregarded entity.”47  As such, it would not have to file a new or 
separate Form 1023 to apply for recognition as a tax-exempt 
organization, and the IRS would look to the organization and 
operation of the parent to assure itself of compliance with relevant 
laws and regulations. 
Third, and with reference to the specific issue under 
consideration of whether the limited liability company form can be 
or is being used as the structure for a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
 
 44. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974; see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 
38, ¶ 1.09[2][c][iii]; HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 30.4, at 928–30. 
 45. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200134025 (Aug. 24, 2001). 
 46. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-3(c)(1) (2011); I.R.S. FORM 8832, supra note 33.  
 47. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY REFERENCE GUIDE SHEET 1 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDE SHEET 
INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet 
_instructions.pdf (“A domestic LLC with a single owner is disregarded for federal 
tax purposes unless it elects to be regarded separately from its member, in which 
case it is treated as an association that is taxable as a corporation.  A disregarded 
LLC whose sole owner is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of 
the Code is not required to pay federal taxes or file a federal tax or information 
return; that is the responsibility of its sole owner.  See Announcement 99-102[,] 
1999-43 I.R.B. 545.  The disregarded entity receives the benefit of its owner’s tax-
exempt status, including exemption from federal income tax, federal 
unemployment tax, and other federal taxes where applicable.  A disregarded 
entity may also choose to report and pay employment tax for its employees.  See 
Notice 99-6, 1999-3 I.R.B. 12.  Nevertheless, the sole owner is generally protected 
against potential liabilities that may arise, under state law, from the activities of its 
disregarded entity.”). 
11
Walker: A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c) (3) Nonprofit Organization
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
638 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2 
organization, the IRS has determined that two or more tax-exempt 
organizations can organize an LLC in which they will be members 
and the LLC will qualify as tax-exempt in its own right, provided 
that twelve conditions are satisfied.48  However, the authorization is 
limited to 501(c)(3) nonprofits as the organizers and the IRS does 
not authorize individuals or non-501(c)(3)s to utilize the LLC to 
form a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.49   
It is instructive to look at the twelve conditions in the context 
of the requirements stated in § 501(c)(3) and the IRS’s emphasis 
on good governance policies and practices.  They are: 
1. Do the organizational documents (e.g., Articles of 
Organization, Operating Agreement, comparable 
organizational documents (or their equivalents)) 
include a specific statement limiting the LLC to one 
or more exempt purposes? 
2. Do the organizational documents specify that the LLC 
is operated exclusively to further the exempt 
purpose(s) of its members? 
3. Does the organizational language require that the 
LLC’s members be limited to section 501(c)(3) 
organizations, governmental units, or wholly owned 
instrumentalities of a state or political subdivision 
thereof? 
4. Does the organizational language prohibit any direct 
 
 48. This position and these conditions were revealed in the IRS’s continuing 
professional education regarding exempt organizations.  RICHARD A. MCCRAY & 
WARD L. THOMAS, I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
AS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS—UPDATE 29–32, available at http://www.irs.gov 
/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf.  The IRS has published a reference guide sheet 
stating these conditions and providing instructions.  See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY REFERENCE GUIDE SHEET (2011) [hereinafter 
GUIDE SHEET], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet.pdf 
(“This Reference Guide Sheet is designed to help process: (1) requests for 
information on the treatment, under federal tax law, of limited liability companies 
associated with tax-exempt organizations, and (2) IRC 501(c)(3) exemption 
applications filed by limited liability companies.”).  A joint venture between two 
nonprofit entities in the form of a limited liability company was one of the 
situations that the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (1994) had in mind when committee members decided to allow an 
LLC to be formed for any lawful purpose, whether or not for profit.  See infra note 
68. 
 49. GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47, at 3 (“An LLC applying for 
exemption under section 501(c)(3) cannot have any members that are individuals 
or are organizations other than 501(c)(3) organizations or governmental units or 
instrumentalities.”). 
12
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or indirect transfer of any membership interest in the 
LLC to a transferee other than a section 501(c)(3) 
organization or governmental unit or instrumentality? 
5. Does the organizational language state that the LLC’s 
assets may only be transferred (whether directly or 
indirectly) to any nonmember, other than a section 
501(c)(3) organization or governmental unit or 
instrumentality, in exchange for fair market value? 
6. Does the organizational language provide that upon 
dissolution of the LLC, the LLC’s assets will continue 
to be devoted to tax-exempt purposes? 
7. Does the organizational language require that any 
amendments to the LLC’s articles of organization and 
operating agreement be consistent with section 
501(c)(3)? 
8. Does the organizational language prohibit the LLC 
from merging with, or converting into, an entity that 
is not exempt under section 501(c)(3)? 
9. Does the organizational language prohibit the LLC 
from distributing any assets, other than in exchange 
for fair market value, to members who have ceased to 
be either organizations described in section 501(c)(3) 
or governmental units or instrumentalities? 
10. Does the organizational language include an 
acceptable contingency plan in the event one or more 
members of the LLC ceases at any time to be an 
organization described in section 501(c)(3) or a 
governmental unit or instrumentality? 
11. Does the organizational language state that the LLC’s 
tax-exempt members will expeditiously and vigorously 
enforce all of their rights in the LLC and pursue all 
legal and equitable remedies to protect their interests 
in the LLC? 
12. Does the LLC represent, in a separate written 
statement, that all of its organizing document 
provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are 
enforceable at law and in equity?50 
It is apparent that these provisions are intended to provide 
assurance that the requirements of § 501(c)(3) are satisfied, 
 
 50. GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48. 
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perhaps some more than others.  The first, second, sixth, and 
seventh conditions reflect and incorporate standard provisions to 
include in a nonprofit corporation’s articles to assure that the 
nonprofit is organized and will be operated exclusively for exempt 
purposes and that charitable assets will remain dedicated to the 
public or charitable purpose, as § 501(c)(3) and accompanying 
regulations command.51  The fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and 
tenth conditions are clearly intended to ensure that “no part of the 
net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual,” as explicitly required by § 501(c)(3).52  Actually, the 
eleventh condition serves this same purpose.  In requiring the 
organizational documents to state or demonstrate that “the LLC’s 
tax-exempt members will expeditiously and vigorously enforce all 
of their rights in the LLC and pursue all legal and equitable 
remedies to protect their interests in the LLC,” the condition 
reflects the IRS’s concern over personal inurement and private 
benefit, excessive compensation, and conflict of interest 
transactions.53  Obligations and duties that attend to members and 
management under applicable law will count for little if they are 
not faithfully observed and “expeditiously and vigorously” 
enforced, so the eleventh condition is in reality another expression 
of the IRS’s emphasis on good governance practices. 
The third condition is of a different order—a means to an 
end—that enables the IRS to look to nonprofit members’ own 
articles of organization and bylaws, at the risk of revocation of the 
members’ tax-exempt status, to be assured of the LLC’s satisfaction 
of the organizational and operational tests, among others.  But it 
also means that individuals who could form a nonprofit 
corporation and constitute its board of directors cannot instead 
organize a limited liability company, provide for it to be manager-
managed perhaps, appoint themselves managers, and undertake to 
 
 51. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)–(c) (2011). 
 52. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48. 
 53. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 24, at 2–4 (“The organization should regularly and consistently monitor 
and enforce compliance with the conflict of interest policy.”); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, FORM 1023, APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION, CAT. NO. 
17133K (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S. FORM 1023], available at http://www.irs.gov 
/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf (including a sample conflict of interest policy); I.R.S., U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME 
TAX, CAT. NO. 11282Y (2010) [hereinafter I.R.S. FORM 990], available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (asking whether the reporting nonprofit has a 
conflict of interest policy). 
14
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comply with the law and regulations regarding 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations.  The problem they face, however, is less the IRS’s 
refusal to extend the limited liability company to individuals and 
non-501(c)(3) organizations wanting to form a nonprofit, than it is 
state law and the rights of “members” of LLCs in earnings,54 
management,55 and assets.56  LLCs grew up in a business context, 
freeing members from a corporate structure and double taxation 
and letting them proceed as partners would, but with a limited 
liability shield for members and the ability through contract to 
structure their deal as they want, free of the mandates and 
regulatory culture which attends corporate practice, even with the 
trend towards “enabling” provisions authorizing corporations to 
vary many corporate norms.  The key word in the third condition is 
“members,” a term with clear and familiar legal significance under 
state laws authorizing the formation of limited liability companies.  
Of course, members in their articles and operating agreement may 
include the necessary statements and provisions that a 501(c)(3) 
organization’s documents must contain, but what will prevent 
amendment—the seventh condition—and what will ensure 
enforcement of a nonprofit governing board’s obligations and 
responsibilities—the eleventh condition?  That, presumably, is the 
point of the twelfth condition: “Does the LLC represent, in a 
separate written statement, that all of its organizing document 
provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are enforceable 
in law and equity?”57  This twelfth condition—focusing on the 
enforceability of provisions in the organizing documents—is 
especially understandable given the state of limited liability 
company law in 2001 when the IRS published its Reference Guide 
Sheet. 
III. ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE LLC LAWS AFFECTING THE 
AVAILABILITY OF AN LLC FOR USE AS A 501(C)(3) NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION 
There have been developments in LLC law since 2001, 
however, and perhaps it is time to reevaluate the IRS’s position.  In 
2003 the Uniform Laws Commission undertook a revision of the 
 
 54. E.g., RULLCA § 404 (2006); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-503 to -504 (2011). 
 55. E.g., RULLCA § 407; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402. 
 56. E.g., RULLCA § 708; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804. 
 57. GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 2. 
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1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and in 2006 it 
promulgated the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.58  
It has been enacted in six jurisdictions,59 introduced in others, and 
is being studied in still more.60  Quite apart from the Uniform Act, 
three states have adopted nonprofit LLC legislation,61 and a fourth 
specifically included in its LLC statute language providing for a 
nonprofit LLC and explicitly incorporating relevant sections of the 
state’s nonprofit corporation act so that they apply as well to 
LLCs.62  Other states have amended their LLC statutes.  Together 
these may address concerns the IRS has expressed about the 
limited liability company as an allowable form for a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization where its organizers are not themselves 
501(c)(3) organizations.  This part of the article examines 
significant state law issues that have to be addressed if an LLC can 
serve as a vehicle for nonprofit activity more broadly than currently 
authorized by the IRS. 
A. Is the Operation of a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit a Proper Purpose for an 
LLC? 
At about the time the IRS was making known and later 
publishing the twelve conditions on the use of limited liability 
companies as exempt organizations,63 the authors of a leading 
treatise on LLC law and taxation stated, “All enabling statutes 
require that a limited liability company have a business purpose.  A 
limited liability company may not be a not-for-profit enterprise.”64  
 
 58. RULLCA, Prefatory Note. 
 59. The District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming.  
D.C. CODE §§ 29-1001–1075 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6 (2011); IOWA CODE 
ANN. Ch. 489 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29 (2011). 
 60. See, e.g., Memorandum from Ron Wargo, Chair, Bus. Law Section, State 
Bar of Cal., to Office of Governmental Affairs (June 1, 2010), http:// 
www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zu68OHm6zHI%3D&tabid=2796 
(seeking to adopt RULLCA under California law). 
 61. Kentucky, North Dakota, and Tennessee.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 
275.520–540 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-01 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
249-309 (2011). 
 62. The fourth state is Minnesota.  See MINN. STAT. § 322.B (2011). 
 63. GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 1–2. 
 64. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: 
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.03 (1994 & Supp. 2002) (footnotes omitted).  The 
authors based this conclusion on some statutes directly requiring a business 
purpose and other statutes implying a for-profit purpose on account of statutory 
provisions for distribution of profits.  They added, “It would make no sense to 
allow a limited liability company to function as a not-for-profit organization.  A 
16
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While the view that all LLC enabling statutes require a business 
purpose undoubtedly was accurate at the time, LLC legislation in 
several states has changed since that time.65  For example, Delaware 
authorizes a limited liability company to “carry on any lawful 
business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit, with the 
exception of the business of banking”66; the 1996 Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act—enacted in eight states—provided that a 
limited liability company could be organized “for any lawful 
purpose”67 and specifically defined “business” to include “every 
trade, occupation, profession, and other lawful purpose, whether 
or not carried on for profit”68; and the Revised Uniform Limited 
 
limited liability company exists to have partnership tax status, and not-for-profit 
entities are subject to an entirely different regime.”  Id. at n.59.  Later editions of 
Bishop & Kleinberger take note of the changes in the text while continuing to 
conclude that an LLC is much better suited for a for-profit business enterprise 
than a nonprofit tax-exempt organization.  See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 
38, ¶ 5.03[1].  For another author who reaches the same conclusion, see MATTHEW 
DORÉ, IOWA BUSINESS LAW AND PRACTICE 283, 295, 295 n.12 (2010). 
 65. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.  
 66. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 6, § 18-
106(a) (2011). 
 67. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 104 (1996).  The eight states that have adopted 
the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act are Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia; the Virgin 
Islands have also adopted the Act.  Id. at References & Annots. 
 68. Id. § 101(3).  Colorado law is to the same effect.  An LLC may be 
organized “for any lawful business” purpose; and, “business” is defined as “any 
lawful activity.”  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(3), -103 (2011).  Whether 
organizers should be able to form a limited liability company for nonprofit 
purposes was raised and discussed at both the 1993 and 1994 Annual Meetings of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
 In 1993, on the morning the proposed Uniform Act was first being read, the 
Chair of the Drafting Committee, Florida Uniform Law Commissioner Edward I. 
Cutler, said, “And may I comment, this [section 112 of the Act] is where you find 
the answer, that the act is designed to deal with even non-businesses, as well as 
nonprofit enterprises.”  Transcript of the Twelfth Session of the 1993 Annual 
Meeting of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 38 (Aug. 5, 
1993) (on file with author).  Commissioner Carl H. Lisman of Vermont rose 
immediately to comment on this position, stating, “It seems to me that the 
committee ought to give serious reconsideration to its decision to sweep into the 
jurisdiction of this act nonprofits and non-businesses.”  Id.  Commissioner Lisman 
went on to say that in contrast to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and the 
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Act, “there are lots of provisions 
in this act that are inappropriate for non [sic] for profit entities.”  Id.  He declined 
to make sense of the house motion at the 1993 Annual Meeting, but he said he 
would revisit the issue at the next Annual Meeting if the Drafting Committee’s 
position remained the same.  Speaking to Commissioner Lisman, Drafting 
Committee member Commissioner Howard Swibel of Illinois explained: 
We are basically putting it out there for one reason, which is to elicit 
17
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response from effected [sic] parties.  There are, for example, a lot of 
joint ventures now between not for profit corporations which could be 
facilitated by the use of this kind of device.  We are looking for input 
from affected parties on this issue. 
Id.  Commissioner Lisman adhered to his position.  If the joint venture was “profit 
motive oriented,” he believed the Act should cover them; and “[i]f they’re not 
profit motive oriented, it doesn’t matter to me whether the constituent members 
are for profits or non-profits.  They shouldn’t be covered by this act.  They’re not 
tax driven.  They’re not limited liability driven in the sense that a for-profit 
organization is.” Id. at 38–39.  The issue was taken under advisement for 
consideration by the Drafting Committee and reported to the Conference in 1994.   
 In 1994 the issue of whether organizers of a nonprofit organization could 
utilize a limited liability company formed under the Uniform Act was identified as 
a significant policy issue for the Conference at its Annual Meeting.  Vermont 
Commissioner Carl Lisman rose again to address the issue: 
I don’t want to let the issue pass again.  This is the first meaningful 
section that deals with whether or not a limited liability company is going 
to also be allowed to usurp the field of non-profit entities.  There are a 
number of provisions in this act that deal with the formation and 
conduct and termination and so forth of a limited liability company that 
make absolutely no sense in the context of non-profits.  The committee 
has acknowledged that it is an issue that they have not fully resolved.  It 
arises on Line 6 on Page 24 in the phrase ‘for any lawful purpose.’  
Maybe it ought to be ‘for any lawful for-profit purpose or any lawful 
business purpose.’  Rather than—this is not a new issue—rather than 
force the issue at this time, I call it to the attention of the floor.  It will be 
raised as we get further on, when we get into more substantive sections. 
Transcript of the Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. 
Act, 1994 Annual Meeting of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State 
Laws 51–52 (July 29, 1994) (on file with author).  Committee Chair Edward I. 
Cutler responded that Commissioner Lisman’s comments “com[e] from the 
chairman of the Unincorporated [Nonprofit] Association Committee of this 
conference, and it’s a well taken point.”  Id.  He went on to explain that the 
inclusion of nonprofit organizations within the scope of the LLC Act was a 
position urged by Millard Ruud, Uniform Law Commissioner from Texas and 
National Conference Reporter for the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Associations Act, who was not on the floor at the time.  Commissioner Cutler said:  
I would like him to explain it, whereby we will put cautionary remarks in 
the comment that will disclose the problems to anyone who wants to 
organize a limited liability company for non-profit purposes, or include a 
non-profit entity as a member of a limited liability company, the various 
points you have in mind.  We thought it would be throwing the baby out 
with the bath water if we did not permit certain kinds of non-profit 
organizations to be allowed to use the limited liability company format. 
Id. at 52–53.  Commissioner Lisman observed that Commissioner Ruud had not 
thought the issue would arise until the afternoon, “which is why I think in part we 
want to defer further discussion of the issue.”  Id. at 53. 
 The issue was raised at the end of the day.  Recognized by the Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole, Commissioner Lisman stated, “The consensus is to let 
the matter ride and let you do it in a comment.”  Id. at 241.  Commissioner 
Matthew S. Rae, Jr., of California, disagreed with this position.  “I see no reason 
why there should be a not for profit entity that would be a limited liability 
18
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Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”) similarly provides that an LLC 
“may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit.”69  If 
profit, or even business, need not be the purpose of the LLC, 
individuals can readily draw on the LLC to hold title to property,70 
which may not represent a “business” in common parlance71 but 
nevertheless can be advantageous to business and estate planning.72 
But does “any lawful purpose” or “regardless of whether for 
profit” mean that these statutes contemplate and authorize 
formation of a nonprofit organization that could qualify as a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit?  Certainly it should be clear that the language 
regarding permissible purposes is broad enough to encompass the 
exempt purposes articulated in § 501(c)(3), and it should not be a 
sufficient objection to the use of an LLC for a charitable nonprofit 
enterprise that it is inconsistent with state law because it lacks a “for 
profit,” “business” purpose.73  If we take the case of RULLCA, is that 
 
company.  It seems that we’re doing this simply for tax purposes.”  Id. at 242.  
Accordingly, he moved “that the act be limited to for profit businesses.”  Id.  
Drafting Committee Chair Cutler stated again that tax reasons were not the only 
reasons for forming an LLC, that “problems with tax or anything else” would be 
dealt with in an Official Comment to section 112, and that “the consensus is that 
we have good reason to let them do it if they can.”  Id.  ABA Adviser Robert 
Keatinge noted that the issue “has been discussed fairly extensively around the 
country and certainly around the drafting table on this act.”  Id. at 243.  “Many of 
the concerns that have been validly raised are concerns that relate not to whether 
an entity is organized for profit or not,” he said, “but whether an entity is tax 
exempt.”  Id.  It was his opinion, and he thought that of the members of the 
Drafting Committee as well, “that’s something that is best left to the Internal 
Revenue Code.”  Id.  Commissioner Rae’s motion did not pass.  Id. at 244. 
 The Official Comment to section 112 of the Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (1994) reads in full: 
“Business.” A limited liability company may be organized to engage in an 
activity either for or not for profit.  The extent to which contributions to 
a nonprofit company may be deductible for Federal income tax purposes 
is determined by federal law.  Other state law determines the extent of 
exemptions from state and local income and property taxes. 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 112 cmt. (1994). 
 69. RULLCA § 104(b) (2006). 
 70. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 5.03[1]. 
 71. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act defines “business” to include “every 
trade, occupation, and profession,” and the section on partnership formation 
provides that the holding of property jointly does not give rise to a presumption of 
partnership formation, “even if the co-owners share profits made by the use of the 
property.”  REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101(1), 202(c)(1) (1997). 
 72. In drafting committee meetings for RULLCA, the example of a family 
owning a cabin or lakeshore property through an LLC was a frequent example of 
the utility of RULLCA’s language “regardless of whether for profit.” 
 73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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what the Drafting Committee or the Conference intended?  The 
answer to that question is less than clear.  One of the goals of the 
drafting committee was to expand the availability and advantages of 
the LLC as a form of organization.74  But again, does that mean 
that a limited liability company formed under the planned, revised 
uniform act was intended to be available to organize a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit?  The prospect was noted and discussed at the first 
meeting of the Uniform Law Commissioners to consider a 
proposed Revised Act,75 and the preliminary and ultimate position 
of the Drafting Committee was to leave crucial protective provisions 
to other law, but to envision and authorize an LLC without a for-
profit purpose. 
As indicated earlier,76 some states have adopted nonprofit LLC 
legislation.  Tennessee, for example, adopted the Nonprofit 
Limited Liability Company Act of 2001.77  What the statute did was 
to authorize a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation to organize an 
LLC as the sole member, thus assuring that the LLC was a 
 
 74. Transcript of Annual Meeting of Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. 
State Laws 5 (Aug. 6, 2003) (listing the remarks of Commissioner and Chair, David 
S. Walker).  One example of a permissible use of an LLC under a revised, 
expanded Uniform Act was a residential cooperative.  Id. at 6–8 (providing the 
remarks of Commissioner Hiroshi Sakai, ABA Advisor Robert R. Keatinge, and 
Commissioner Harry Haynsworth). 
 75. Id. at 5 (listing the remarks of Commissioner and Chair David S. Walker); 
id. at 8 (listing the remarks of Commissioner William R. Breetz, Jr.).  
Commissioner Walker represented that the Drafting Committee’s position “is that 
we should leave [provisions in state laws addressing the role of the state in 
ensuring that property given for charitable purposes continues to serve those 
charitable purposes] to other [state] law rather than to build into this statute on 
limited liability companies protections of that charitable purpose.”  Id. at 5.  
Commissioner Breetz noted that broadening the Act to include charitable 
nonprofits would invite a “heightened level of scrutiny by the IRS at the whole 
form of ownership, because they would be obliged in making an analysis under an 
application for 501-C-3 tax exemption as to whether this LLC has as its purpose 
primarily a nonprofit purpose or a for-profit purpose.”  Id. at 9.  He noted the 
interest that “substantial institutions like universities and hospitals” would have, 
and he commented further that: 
[T]here are just tens of thousands of little, tiny nonprofit groups all over 
the country who are using the Nonprofit Corporation Act as their sole 
means of doing business, and there are some considerable historical 
differences between the two forms that you’re going to have to 
contemplate, I think, in your drafting process.  Methods of control, for 
example.  Minimum number of directorships that are part of the model 
act. 
Id. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 66–69. 
 77. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-701 to -708 (2011). 
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“disregarded entity for federal income tax purposes” and serving 
the parent’s purposes as described above.78  Kentucky legislation, 
adopted in 2006, amends the state’s LLC Act to include a nonprofit 
limited liability company,79 allows a nonprofit limited liability 
company to be formed for a nonprofit purpose,80 and references, 
in the definition of “nonprofit purpose,” the purposes clause of 
Kentucky’s nonprofit corporation act.81  Minnesota also provides 
explicitly for a nonprofit limited liability company, disavows that 
formation under its legislation is “determinative of its tax 
treatment,” and expressly includes protective provisions of the sort 
that RULLCA left to other law.82  And in 2009, North Dakota 
enacted its Nonprofit Limited Liability Company Act similarly 
expressly authorizing a limited liability company to be formed for a 
nonprofit purpose, incorporating by reference protective 
provisions found in the nonprofit corporation statute, and 
disavowing that formation under the Act is determinative of federal 
tax treatment.83 
What is clear under these statutes and also, in truth, under 
statutes like RULLCA, is that assumptions about the “purpose” of 
an LLC are not a persuasive or acceptable basis for preventing 
individuals or non-501(c)(3) organizations from forming a 
nonprofit limited liability company that merits consideration for 
recognition as a tax-exempt organization.  There must be another 
reason, other than most common usage—which is clearly for-
profit—or notions of inherent purpose based on the widespread 
popularity of the LLC for federal tax purposes under a regime 
entirely different from the one governing nonprofit organizations, 
to preclude an LLC from being organized as a nonprofit and 
qualifying for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). 
 
 
 78. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 79. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.005 (2011).  The Secretary of State’s Office in 
Kentucky reports that 303 nonprofit limited liability companies have been formed 
under this statute.  E-mail from J. Allen Eskridge, III, Ky. Assistant Sec’y of State, to 
author (Aug. 12, 2011) (on file with author). 
 80. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015(18) (2011). 
 81. Id. §§ 275.015(19), 273.167. 
 82. MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.03, subdiv. 31a, 322B.975 (2011). 
 83. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-36-01 to -09 (2011). 
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B. Is the “Management Structure” of an LLC Inappropriate for a 
Nonprofit LLC? 
While neither § 501(c)(3) nor the IRS in its policies prescribes 
a particular management structure, the IRS plainly expects much 
of management, both in the initial showing through the completed 
Form 1023 and in the annual informational reports, such as Form 
990.84  “Regardless of whether a charity is a trust, corporation, 
unincorporated association, or other type of organization, it must 
have organizational documents that provide the framework for its 
governance and management.”85  There must be some “governing 
board,” and the governing board is encouraged (1) to establish, 
adopt, regularly review, and popularize a mission statement; (2) to 
become and remain “active and engaged” in governance and 
compliance; (3) to adopt governance and management policies, 
especially concerning executive compensation, conflicts of interest, 
investments, fundraising, record keeping, document retention and 
destruction, and ethics and whistleblowing; (4) to ensure proper 
preparation of and review financial statements and Form 990 and 
“ensure that [the charity] abides by the requirements of state law” 
and federal law; and (5) to be committed to transparency and 
accountability to constituents.86  The emphatic importance of good 
nonprofit governance to the IRS is not in doubt by any means.  Any 
number of cases, regulations, rulings, required forms like Form 
990, and more communicate that point clearly. 
But there should be nothing about the management structure 
envisioned by state LLC acts to prevent practices along the lines 
described above from being adopted by those managing the 
limited liability company.  It is true that one of the attractive 
features of the limited liability company under state laws is the 
flexibility that members have to create and tailor the management 
structure in a way that for them will be most effective in ensuring 
the successful pursuit of goals and conduct of the LLC’s affairs.  
Those creating the LLC may choose to have it be “member-
managed,” in which the members have equal or whatever 
negotiated voice in the management of the ordinary affairs of the 
company, or they may choose to be “manager-managed,” elect 
 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 85. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
24, at 2. 
 86. Id. at 2–8. 
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managers from their number, and have the managers manage the 
company as a “board of managers” or even a “board of directors.”87  
Or they may allocate authority among them, drawing on particular 
strengths of each.88  In any of these cases, those responsible for 
managing a nonprofit LLC seeking tax-exemption under § 
501(c)(3) may vigorously follow the counsel of the IRS briefly 
described above and provide the good, sound governance the Code 
and the IRS expect and demand. 
To be sure, some structure is required by § 501(c)(3) and 
implementing regulations, for the very terms of the Code require 
that the nonprofit be a “[c]orporation[, or] any community chest, 
fund, or foundation.”89  There must be an entity apart from 
individuals organized and operated exclusively as a charity; the 
notion of “organization” requires agreement and “a regulatory 
framework of government or mode of operation.”90  An LLC is an 
entity apart from its members, however, and LLC legislation clearly 
contemplates organization and management structure.  It is an 
unincorporated entity, but an unincorporated nonprofit 
association may secure recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt 
organization if it has organic rules or articles of organization and 
its documents contain provisions committing the association to 
compliance with § 501(c)(3)’s requirements.91 
In short, the management structures open to an LLC should 
not present a problem in qualifying as a tax-exempt nonprofit 
organization.  As a practical matter, it might be advisable to elect to 
be manager-managed and to constitute the managers as a “board of 
managers,” “board of governors,” or “board of directors” as the 
Minnesota and North Dakota LLC Acts envision.92  Indeed, in 
Revenue Ruling 98-15 discussed earlier,93 in which the IRS held 
 
 87. RULLCA § 407 (2006). 
 88. Id. §§ 110, 407; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-401 to -404 (2011). 
 89. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 90. Trippe v. Comm’r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 622 (1950); see 4 Internal Revenue 
Manual-Admin. (CCH) pt. 7751, § 321.4, at 20,556 (Apr. 28, 1977) (stating 
forcefully, “[a] formless aggregation of individuals without some organizing 
instrument, governing rules, and regularly chosen officers would not be a 
[‘corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation’] for purposes of § 
501(c)(3),” and, thus, would not be a tax exempt charitable entity).  
 91. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 49; see also I.R.S. FORM 1023, supra 
note 53; see supra Parts II (Question 3), III. 
 92. MINN. STAT. § 322B.03, subdivs. 7–8 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-03 
(2011). 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 38–44. 
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that a 501(c)(3) nonprofit that entered into a joint venture in the 
form of an LLC with a for-profit entity would continue to qualify as 
a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, the co-venturers forming the 
LLC created a “governing board.”  Thus, it would probably be good 
sense for the nonprofit LLC to be manager-managed and have a 
“board of managers.”  Given the operational necessities for larger 
charities—appointment and evaluation of officers, setting executive 
compensation, preparation and review of budgets and financial 
statements, assurance of compliance with applicable law, including 
federal tax law, to give some examples—a governing board would, 
as a practical matter, seem essential to the decision making and 
oversight that would be required to qualify for § 501(c)(3) status 
and that would be required under state law.  But a “board” 
structure should not be essential.  If it were member-managed, the 
members would be the managers.  Legally, there is no prescribed 
size for a board,94 just an expectation that it be effective, and 
depending on the number of members, the members might 
function like a board.  While a more formal, corporate-like board 
structure would be advisable for larger charities, for smaller 
charities—of which there are many95—it is imaginable that there 
would be few organizers or governors and that the member-
managed structure would be preferable and no less effective than a 
formal board structure. 
Structure implies composition and operation, and each of 
these subjects is undeniably of crucial importance to qualification 
as a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization under § 501(c)(3).  With 
respect to composition, the IRS expects the board to include 
independent members who will represent the public interest and 
advises that a “very small” governing board “may not adequately 
serve the needs of the organization.”96  Moreover, the IRS looks to 
 
 94. MNCA section 8.03 does require a minimum of three directors, but there 
is no equivalent provision in limited liability company acts.  MNCA § 8.03 (2008).  
LLC legislation pointedly does not prescribe a “manager-managed” structure, but 
instead leaves management structure to the members to determine.  RULLCA § 
407(a) (2006).  LLC legislation also does not prescribe a minimum number of 
either managers or members beyond the necessity that there be at least one 
member to constitute an LLC.  See, e.g., id. § 201(a), (d)–(e) (stating that the 
limited liability company is formed only when it has “at least one member”). 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
 96. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
24, at 2 (“Small boards run the risk of not representing a sufficiently broad public 
interest and of lacking the required skills and other resources required to 
effectively govern the organization.”).  The IRS has often emphasized the 
24
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disinterested and independent directors to ensure that there are 
no insider transactions that could result in misuse of charitable 
assets, including excessive compensation that would run afoul of 
the proscription on private inurement and constitute an excess 
benefit transaction.97  The position taken and advice given by the 
IRS reflect its emphasis on good governance as a vital means to 
ensure compliance with the tax laws and regulations.  Essentially 
the IRS is concerned about conflict of interest transactions.  Such 
transactions may be beneficial to the nonprofit organization, but 
they may also result in private inurement or private benefit.  The 
IRS expects to avoid the latter result through good governance and 
compliance with state law.  That requires the presence of 
independent directors or “managers” to whom full disclosure of all 
material facts must be made and who, before they will approve a 
proposed transaction, will fully inform themselves about the 
transaction and scrutinize it to ensure that it is in the best interests 
of the organization.  Nonprofit corporate law provides a procedure 
that addresses conflicting interest transactions and requires a 
process that includes full disclosure to and approval by 
“disinterested directors.”98  LLC legislation similarly does so, albeit 
in a more abbreviated fashion.99  Any charitable nonprofit—large 
or small, in corporate form or, if available, in the form of an LLC—
would have to ensure that it was not violating the private inurement 
and private benefit proscriptions of § 501(c)(3) or authorizing an 
excess benefit transaction; the form of the entity, however, is not 
material to whether disinterested and independent persons are 
included in the management.  It may be that a nonprofit limited 
liability company might be more attractive to a “smaller charity” 
than a nonprofit corporation because of its fewer mandates and 
reduced expectation of formality—i.e., its greater flexibility.  For 
smaller charities it might be more difficult to obtain disinterested 
persons to serve on a governing board and fulfill expectations 
under both state law and federal tax law.  But in either case the 
nature of the entity itself does not ensure or preclude its doing so. 
Structure also implies operation of the governing board.  As 
 
importance of the board of a charitable nonprofit organization being drawn from 
the community and representing the public.  E.g., Rev. Rul. 98-15; Rev. Rul. 69-
545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 97. I.R.C. § 4958 (Supp. 2010); GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 24, at 3. 
 98. E.g., MNCA § 8.60. 
 99. E.g., RULLCA §§ 110(e), 409(b)(2), (e), (f) (2006). 
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mentioned above and as is widely known, the limited liability 
company frees those managing it and conducting its business and 
affairs from the detailed prescriptions and required formalities that 
are common in nonprofit corporation acts, mirroring as they often 
do for-profit corporate legislation.  LLCs are significantly 
“creature[s] of contract.”100  Matters of procedure in an LLC are 
generally left to the parties to deal with through the operating 
agreement.101  The operating agreement may be “oral, in a record, 
implied, or in any combination” of these.102  Courts may give lesser 
weight to formalities in a small limited liability company where 
formalities clearly are not observed and may choose not to 
disregard the LLC as an entity separate from the members;103 
corporate law, for-profit or nonprofit, is different.  Questions like 
whether directors can participate electronically or over the 
telephone in a board meeting; whether directors can vote by email; 
whether directors can take action without a meeting; and whether 
directors can vote by proxy, to give some examples—none of which 
are addressed in the typical limited liability company act—are dealt 
with in nonprofit corporate legislation, or if not, present serious 
questions.104 
The informality and flexibility which a limited liability 
company may take advantage of, including charities, particularly 
small charities, if they were permitted to form a nonprofit LLC, 
 
 100. RULLCA § 110 cmt.; Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter. G. Bishop, The Next 
Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 545 
(2007). 
 101. RULLCA § 110(a). 
 102. Id. § 102(13). 
 103. RULLCA § 304(b); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101 (2011); see, e.g., D. R. 
Horton, Inc.-N.J. v. Dynstar Dev., LLC, 2005 WL 1939778 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
Aug. 10, 2005). 
 104. MNCA § 8.20 (2008).  The act authorizes a director “to participate in a 
regular or special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, any 
means of communication by which all directors participating may simultaneously 
hear each other during the meeting” and provides that “[a] director participating 
in a meeting by this means is considered to be present in person at the meeting.”  
Id.  Section 8.24 addresses voting by directors, but is silent on voting by e-mail and 
does not authorize directors to vote by proxy.  Id. § 8.24.  Unless the articles 
require that action be taken at a meeting, directors may take action without a 
meeting “if each director signs a consent in the form of a record describing the 
action to be taken and delivers it to the nonprofit corporation.”  Id. § 8.21.  Several 
of the questions mentioned were discussed recently on the listserv of the 
Nonprofit Organizations Committee of the ABA’s Business Law Section.  See 
Postings of Members of the Nonprofit Orgs. Comm. of the A.B.A. Bus. Law 
Section, bl-nonprofit@mail.americanbar.org (on file with author). 
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would necessarily be limited by the requirements imposed on them 
by § 501(c)(3) as interpreted and applied by the IRS.  A 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit must actually be operated for and also be able to demonstrate 
or prove such operation in furtherance of its exempt purposes.105  For 
the IRS, formalities matter and are expected to be observed.  For 
example, minutes of meetings should be taken and preserved so 
that there is contemporaneous documentation of meetings and 
action taken by written consent without a meeting.106  Minutes can 
provide useful evidence of the directors staying informed, 
exercising due care in decision making and oversight, and dealing 
appropriately with conflicts of interest, executive compensation, 
and similar matters.107  Minutes and record keeping can document 
that a decision was made and due consideration given to it so that a 
court will defer to the directors’ or governors’ judgment.  And if 
the question were to arise, observance of formalities can help to 
avoid disregard of the nonprofit entity.  For the IRS, preparation 
and keeping records is evidence of the good governance it believes 
is more likely to secure, if not essential to, compliance with federal 
tax and other laws.  Thus, on Form 990 the IRS requires a 
nonprofit organization that is obligated to file to answer the 
questions: “Did the organization contemporaneously document the 
meetings held or written actions undertaken during the year by the 
following: (a) The governing body; (b) Each committee with 
authority to act on behalf of the governing body?”108  The IRS’s 
requirement in this regard has been criticized as impractical and 
 
 105. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (c) (2011); I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB NO. 4221-NC, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
(OTHER THAN 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES AND PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS) 14 (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221nc.pdf (“In general, a tax-
exempt organization must maintain books and records to show that it complies 
with tax rules.”); GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, 
supra note 24, at 5–6. 
 106. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
24, at 5. 
 107. David M. Bardsley, Composition and Operation of the Board of Directors, in 
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 103, 111 (Victor Futter et al. eds., 
2002); GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 36 (George W. 
Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002); LISA A. RUNQUIST, THE 
ABCS OF NONPROFITS 80–82 (2005). 
 108. I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 8a–8b); see also James 
J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 
VA. TAX REV. 545, 568 (2010) (“All organizations that file Form 990 must complete 
the section, Part VI, that requests information regarding an organization’s 
governing body and management, its governance policies, and disclosure 
practices.”). 
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unnecessarily burdensome for medium-size and smaller charities,109 
but the requirement remains.  Accordingly, some of the hoped-for 
flexibility and informality that an LLC would offer to a small charity 
might in certain respects be unavailable or unwise as a practical 
matter. 
Whatever the burden of preparing minutes and other records, 
it would not be less if the nonprofit were in the form of a nonprofit 
corporation rather than an LLC.  Either way the nonprofit must be 
able to show that it is complying with the requirements of the tax 
laws, and Form 990 does not depend on the nature of the entity in 
this regard.110  Nothing inherent in the structure, possible 
composition of its management or governing board, or manner of 
operation of an LLC precludes recognition of it by the IRS as a tax-
exempt entity if other obstacles do not appear and cannot be 
addressed.  The IRS would, in any event, look to the duties or 
responsibilities of the managers or governing body to ensure 
compliance and continued qualification for treatment under § 
501(c)(3).111  That is the very nature of its emphasis on governance 
in the nonprofit sector.  The important questions would be the 
responsibilities or fiduciary duties of the managers, to whom they 
are owed, and whether and how they are fulfilled and enforced.  
Let us turn first to the subject of fiduciary duties. 
C.   Fiduciary Duties and Responsibilities of LLC Management 
In focusing on nonprofit governance, the IRS is recognizing 
and underscoring the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of the 
governing board or managers of a qualifying nonprofit.  Prevention 
of unreasonable compensation, excess benefits, and conflict of 
interest transactions, for example, rests on fulfillment of the 
managers’ duty of loyalty “to act in the interest of the charity rather 
than in the personal interest of the director or some other person 
or organization” and “to avoid conflicts of interest that are 
 
 109. James J. Fishman, The IRS’ Corporate Governance Initiative: Recommendations 
for Medium and Smaller Nonprofits, in ADVISING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 299, 332–
35 (2009).  Professor Fishman characterizes the IRS’s requirement for minutes of 
every meeting as “documentation run amok” and comments, “[s]maller 
organizations often conduct committee meetings informally.  It can become a 
burdensome commitment of staff time to take and prepare minutes of all actions 
taken, particularly at the committee level.”  Id. at 332–33. 
 110. See I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 8a–8b). 
 111. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
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detrimental to the charity.”112  The instructions to Form 1023 
include a sample conflict of interest policy, and Form 990 asks 
directly about the existence, substance, and enforcement of a 
conflict of interest policy.113  Selection, monitoring, and evaluation 
of executives; determination of reasonable compensation; 
establishment of a budget and review of financial statements; taking 
care to ensure that forms and returns are accurately completed and 
timely filed and that the nonprofit is otherwise in compliance with 
the requirements of § 501(c)(3); oversight of fundraising and 
investments to ensure compliance with federal and state law; 
adoption of proper policies and procedures; preparation and 
retention of records; and “setting ethical standards and ensuring 
they permeate the organization and inform its practices”114—all of 
these require an informed, attentive, and diligent board exercising 
good judgment on behalf of the nonprofit and with only its best 
interest in mind.  In short, they assume a duty of care and duty of 
loyalty that those responsible for governing the nonprofit will 
fulfill. 
Are there differences between the fiduciary duties applicable 
to limited liability companies and the fiduciary duties owed by 
directors of nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts?  Nonprofit 
corporate law imposes on directors both a duty of loyalty and a duty 
of care.115  “Each member of the board of directors, when 
discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and 
(2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
 
 112. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
24, at 3–5. 
 113. I.R.S. FORM 990, supra note 53, at Part VI (Questions 12a–12c); I.R.S. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023, APPENDIX A (2006), available at I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023, APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF 
EXEMPTION, CAT. NO. 17132Z, app. A at 25–26 (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023 
.pdf.  The IRS does not in terms require adoption of a conflict of interest policy; 
but the existence or nonexistence of such a policy is taken into account by the IRS 
in determining whether to recognize an organization as tax-exempt, and 
Appendix A to the Instructions for Form 1023 contains a sample conflict of 
interest policy that the IRS recommends be adopted.  I.R.S. INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FORM 1023. 
 114. GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
24, at 2–7 (providing examples that are illustrated in text accompanying note 
114). 
 115. Under RUUNAA, the members of an unincorporated nonprofit 
association select managers, and the managers are also subject to duties of loyalty 
and care.  RUUNAA § 23 (2008).  Section 22 provides that if the members do not 
select managers, the members are the managers.  Id. § 22. 
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interests of the nonprofit corporation.”116  The duty of loyalty is 
conveyed through the obligation to act “in the best interests of the 
nonprofit corporation.”  Conflict of interest transactions are 
addressed directly in the statute,117 and a separate provision offers a 
statutory safe harbor to a director presenting a business 
opportunity first to the disinterested directors, with full disclosure 
of material facts, who decline the opportunity.118  Much of the law 
articulating and applying the duty of loyalty in the corporate 
context is case law.119  The standard of care quoted above is not the 
same as the standard of liability.  That is shaped by, among other 
things, the business judgment rule and is dealt with separately.120  
The business judgment rule—which may be “more appropriately 
known in the nonprofit context as the best judgment rule”121—
provides a presumption that the director exercised due care in 
making a decision in the absence of the plaintiff showing that the 
director was not disinterested or was not informed to the extent the 
director could reasonably have believed appropriate in the 
circumstances.122  As a result, it has been held in an influential 
 
 116. MNCA § 8.30(a) (2008); see also, e.g., A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGS. §§ 300, 310, 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (discussing 
governing-board members’ fiduciary duties, duty of loyalty, and duty of care).  See 
generally GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 107, 
at 17–42 (discussing the duties and rights of nonprofit corporation directors, 
including the duty of care and duty of loyalty); David B. Rigney, Duties and Potential 
Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFIT 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 83–102 (Victor Futter ed., 2002) (summarizing the 
duties of nonprofit organization directors and officers and analyzing standards of 
performance and potential liabilities). 
 117. MNCA § 8.60.  In addition, section 8.32(a) provides that “[a] nonprofit 
corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation of a director or 
officer of the corporation.”  Id. § 8.32(a). 
 118. Id. § 8.70. 
 119. E.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & 
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (involving transactions with 
conflicting interests and discussing both duty of care and duty of loyalty); Mile-O-
Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 210 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (analyzing 
competition with the nonprofit corporation); Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 
661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995) (exploring usurpation of nonprofit corporate 
opportunity). 
 120. MNCA § 8.31 cmt.  This approach follows provisions in the Model 
Business Corporation Act.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984). 
 121. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 152–53. 
 122. The business judgment rule has been recognized and expressed by the 
American Law Institute.  A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1992).  The ALI adds a third prong, namely that 
the director must “rationally believe[] that the business judgment is in the best 
interests of the corporation.”  Id. § 4.01(c)(3).  In section 365 of Principles of the 
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opinion that in order for a director of a nonprofit corporation to 
be found liable for breach of the duty of care, the director must 
“have committed ‘gross negligence’ or otherwise be guilty of more 
than mere mistakes of judgment.”123  In contrast, the trustee of a 
charitable trust has been found to breach the trustee’s duty of care 
for negligence alone, not gross negligence.124  According to one 
leading authority, however, there has been a convergence of 
standards, and the corporate fiduciary standards are coming to be 
applied to both trustees of charitable trusts and directors of 
nonprofit corporations.125 
Those responsible for managing a limited liability company 
similarly owe duties of care and loyalty.  Courts have applied 
common law fiduciary standards and analogized to closely held 
corporations in defining the fiduciary duties applicable to members 
or managers of an LLC.126  Some states that have adopted nonprofit 
limited liability company legislation have made provisions of their 
nonprofit corporation law stating directors’ duties applicable to 
nonprofit LLCs.127  A number of jurisdictions have adopted 
RULLCA, which recognizes and defines a duty of loyalty128 and a 
 
Law of Nonprofit Organizations, the ALI is presently articulating the business 
judgment rule in substantially the same terms.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 365. 
 123. Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013. 
 124. E.g., Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Ct. App. 
1970); In re Estate of Donner, 626 N.E.2d 922, 927 (N.Y. 1993). 
 125. The American Law Institute is thus not presently distinguishing between 
the duties of loyalty and care owed by nonprofit corporate directors and charitable 
trustees or other governors of nonprofit organizations.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 26, §§ 310, 315.  Elsewhere it explained that the 
Principles would deal with the consequences of differences between the forms of 
charity on an issue-by-issue basis.   
Among the most important potential differences between charitable 
trusts and nonprofit charitable corporations are fiduciary standards and 
consequences for breach; settlor and donor control versus decisional 
autonomy for the governing board; and supervisory regimes.  In these 
three important areas, however, trust and corporate law have been 
conforming, with the general result that corporate fiduciary standards of 
conduct are being applied to both trustees of charitable trusts and 
members of a nonprofit corporate board . . . . 
Id. § 200 cmt. b. 
 126. Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 898–900 (N.D. 
Ind. 2002); Purcell v. S. Hills Invs., LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); 
Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 815 (Mass. 2009). 
 127. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 322B.975, subdiv. 5(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
36-03(1) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. 48-101-705(a) (2011). 
 128. RULLCA § 409(b)(1)–(3) (2006). 
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duty of care.129  The provisions of RULLCA dealing with the duties 
of loyalty and care are substantially the same as those applicable to 
nonprofit corporations.130  Misappropriation of LLC property or 
opportunities, a conflicting interest transaction, and competition 
with the LLC during the conduct or winding up of its affairs are 
actions that would violate the duty of loyalty, and the standard for 
liability for breach of the duty of care is essentially one of gross 
negligence.131 
Any differences between the fiduciary duties of directors of 
nonprofit corporations and the duties of managers of limited 
liability companies, therefore, seem negligible in terms of the good 
governance expectations of the IRS for governing boards of tax-
exempt charitable nonprofits.  What may be of more concern is the 
ability of members of limited liability companies to tailor—that is, 
to alter, abridge, or even eliminate—the fiduciary duties owed by 
LLC management to the LLC and to one another.  Reflecting the 
nature of the LLC as a “creature of contract,” this ability has been 
one of the widely perceived benefits of selecting the limited liability 
company form.  RULLCA allows members to alter fiduciary duties 
 
 129. Id. § 409(c). 
 130. See GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 
116, at 19–20, 29 (discussing nonprofit corporation directors’ duties of loyalty and 
care); see also MNCA § 8.30 (2008) (covering the standards of conduct for 
nonprofit corporation directors). 
 131. RULLCA § 409(c) states the duty of care in terms similar to the 
formulation provided in sections 8.30 and 8.31 of the Model Business Corporation 
Act, but makes the duty “[s]ubject to the business judgment rule.”  RULLCA § 
409(c) (2006); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-.31 (1984).  The intended 
effect of that language was to recognize a gross negligence standard where, within 
a state that would adopt RULLCA, that would be the effect of applying the 
business judgment rule.  E.g., Smith v. VanGorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 
2009).  That is the position taken in the Stern case.  Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l 
Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).  
At the Uniform Laws Commission 2011 Annual Meeting, the Commission 
approved an updated version of RULLCA harmonized with the the Commission’s 
other unincorporated business entity acts that revises section 409 of RULLCA and 
explicitly adopts the standard of “refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or 
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”  See 
RULLCA § 409; UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c) (2001); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 
404(c) (1997); Uniform Laws Commission Wraps Up 120th Annual Meeting, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N (July 13, 2011), http://www.nccusl.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=Uniform 
%20Law%20Commission%20Wraps%20Up%20120th%20Annual%20Meeting.  
That is the standard of care provided in section 404(c) of the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act and section 408(c) of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.  UNIF. 
LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(c); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c). 
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in the operating agreement,132 subject only to a stringently defined 
test of manifest unreasonableness and the contractual obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing.133  The Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act allows members not only to restrict fiduciary duties 
but also to eliminate them altogether, though they may not 
eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.134  It is not clear that this can be done in the case of a 
nonprofit corporation.135  However, there is authority that holds 
that, subject to limits, fiduciary duties of the governing board of a 
nonprofit organization may be modified.136  Doing so, however, is 
expressly made “subject to limits,” and it seems unlikely that a 
nonprofit limited liability company applying for recognition as a 
tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization would reduce applicable 
fiduciary duties without very good cause.  Possibly, a nonprofit 
might do so in order to attract to the governing board 
uncompensated volunteers who would provide independent and 
disinterested expertise and perspective.  Federal137 and state138 law 
 
 132. RULLCA § 110. 
 133. Id. §§ 110(h), 409(d). 
 134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2011). 
 135. There is nothing in Model Nonprofit Corporation Act sections discussing 
directors’ duties giving any indication that the duties imposed by those sections 
may be modified, reduced, or eliminated.  See MNCA §§ 8.30–.31. 
 136. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 305.  
Section 305 provides: 
Fiduciary duties may be modified by or as permitted in the organizational 
documents, except that no modification may— 
(a) Reduce the duty of loyalty provided in § 310 in a manner that is 
manifestly unreasonable, taking into account the charitable nature of the 
organization. 
(b) Reduce the duty of care provided in § 315 so as to permit a knowing 
violation of law, intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or gross 
negligence. 
(c) Absolve a fiduciary from the obligation to act in good faith. 
Id. 
 137. The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501–14505 (Supp. 
2009), provides volunteers with protection from liability to third parties “related to 
[their] serving nonprofit organizations and governmental entities,” and it 
preempts inconsistent state law except to the extent the state provides additional 
protection from liability relating to volunteers.  Id. § 14501(b).  With some 
exceptions, the Act states that “no volunteer of a nonprofit organization or 
governmental entity shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the 
volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity” if (1) the volunteer was acting 
within the scope of the volunteer’s responsibilities at the time of the act or 
omission, (2) the volunteer was properly licensed, certified, or authorized for the 
activities or practice if appropriate or required, (3) “the harm was not caused by 
willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a 
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typically provide volunteers, including directors, with immunity 
from personal liability except in stated circumstances, and state law 
also allows an organization through its articles to limit or eliminate 
monetary liability for any action or failure to act, again with certain 
exceptions.  In consequence, reduction of the fiduciary duties of 
members of the governing board of charitable nonprofit 
organizations—as could be done under many states’ LLC laws and 
certainly RULLCA—should not be necessary.  Moreover, any 
reduction of the standards for the duty of care or duty of loyalty 
would surely draw close scrutiny from the IRS in evaluating the 
completed Form 1023, and a nonprofit LLC would be unlikely to 
do so without clear and persuasive justification.  The authority that 
those organizing an LLC have to modify the duty of care and the 
duty of loyalty, therefore, should not present problems that cannot 
be addressed or avoided. 
There is still another duty that should be mentioned.  
Directors of a nonprofit corporation are said to owe a duty of 
obedience to the organization to carry out its purposes as 
expressed in the articles of organization or certificate of 
incorporation139 and ensure that the organization “operates to 
further its stated objectives in compliance with applicable legal 
requirements.”140  According to one court, the “duty of obedience” 
 
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by 
the volunteer,” and (4) the harm was not caused by the volunteer operating a 
motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which the State required the 
operator or owner to possess a license or to maintain insurance.  Id. § 
14503(a)(1)–(3).  The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, however, does not 
address or affect the responsibility of volunteers to a nonprofit organization or 
governmental entity under applicable State law: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to affect any civil action brought by any nonprofit organization or any 
governmental entity against any volunteer of such organization or entity.”  Id. §§ 
14501–14505. 
 138. At the option of the nonprofit organization, state nonprofit corporation 
law typically does provide directors and officers with a shield from personal 
liability for monetary damages for breach of their duties to the corporation and its 
members, but subject to exceptions for conflict of interest transactions, breach of 
the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith involving intentional 
misconduct or knowing violation of law, and unlawful distributions.  E.g., MNCA § 
2.02(b)(8), (c) (2008); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(5) (2002).  
According to one authority, “Approximately one-half of the states protect all 
uncompensated volunteers regardless of their position.”  FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, 
supra note 1 (citing Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, Letting Good Deeds Go 
Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
535 (2009)).  Iowa Code section 613.19 is an example of such a statute. 
 139. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 199–202. 
 140. Rigney, supra note 116, at 83, 87.  The authors of Nonprofit Law and 
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requires directors “to ensure that the mission of the charitable 
corporation is carried out” and to “be faithful to the purposes and 
goals of the organization.”141  Not all agree that a duty of obedience 
exists,142 and in the developing Principles of the Law of Nonprofit 
Organizations the American Law Institute (“ALI”) declines to 
recognize it except as a part of the duty of loyalty.143  The ALI 
explains that while the governing board “must adhere to the 
organizational documents,” the board has an obligation “to keep 
the purpose of the charity current and useful,” which may require 
amendment.144 
Regardless of whether there is a duty of obedience, the duty of 
loyalty would command the managers or governors of a nonprofit 
 
Litigation express this same view: “Thus, a nonprofit’s unique accountability to the 
public and to its donors imposes an additional duty of obedience that dictates how 
each director exercises the duty of care and demonstrates loyalty to the 
organization.”  F. Brooks Cowan et. al, Nonprofit Law and Litigation, in 2 ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 1453, § 23.2 at 
1459 (2011). In the recently published third edition of Nonprofit Governance and 
Management, the authors recognize that there is disagreement whether a duty of 
obedience separate from other duties exists but state, “In either case, adherence to 
or support of the organization’s mission is a fundamental expectation of nonprofit 
directors.”  NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 11 (Cheryl Sorokin et al. 
eds, 3d ed. 2011). 
 141. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 
(App. Div. 1999) (citation omitted). 
 142. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 202. 
 143. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 116, § 300 cmt. g 
(3).  The comment addresses the requirement of good faith in the exercise of the 
duties of loyalty and care, and it provides: 
  As part of their duties of loyalty and care, board members may not 
knowingly cause or permit the charity to violate the law or the charity’s 
organizational documents and policies. . . . Moreover, the board must 
take reasonable steps to ensure that management is legally and ethically 
compliant and that management has established internal controls that 
permit the board to determine compliance . . . and to remedy 
wrongdoing by management . . . . 
  Some commentators place the obligation to obey the law and the 
organizational documents and policies under a third duty unique to 
charity fiduciaries—the “duty of obedience.”  Substantively, to these 
commentators, such a duty embraces a faithfulness to the purposes of the 
charity.  These Principles, however, do not employ the terminology of a 
duty of obedience.  While the members of the governing board must 
adhere to the organizational documents, they also have the obligation to 
keep the purpose of the charity current and useful.  Accordingly, the 
board must amend the stated purposes when necessary and appropriate 
to do so, in accordance with the law and the existing organizational 
documents. 
Id. 
 144. Id. 
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limited liability company to further the exempt and charitable 
purposes of the organization and comply with state law governing 
the organization and federal tax law providing the exemption for 
which the nonprofit was seeking to qualify.  For a nonprofit limited 
liability company formed under state law not specifically providing 
for a nonprofit LLC, that creates a problem.  It would be easy 
enough to include in the articles and operating agreement the 
required, standard provisions attesting that the organization was 
organized exclusively and would exclusively be operated for 
exempt purposes, and that on dissolution its assets would be 
distributed to further the same or similar exempt purposes, or to 
another exempt organization, or to government.  But even if these 
provisions are included in the organizational documents—the 
articles or certificate and the operating agreement—the question 
is, as the IRS expressed it in its Limited Liability Company Reference 
Guide Sheet, can the LLC represent “that all of its organizing 
document provisions are consistent with state LLC laws, and are 
enforceable at law and in equity?”145 
D. State LLC Laws and the Requirements for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit 
Organization 
The language of § 501(c)(3) is unqualified and clear, and it is 
axiomatic that “no part of the net earnings [may] . . . inure[] to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”146  It is the 
practice to include such a provision in the articles of organization 
of a nonprofit seeking to qualify under § 501(c)(3), and an 
organization would fail the operational test if any part of its 
earnings are distributed to a private shareholder or individual.  
Moreover, “An organization is not organized exclusively for one or 
more exempt purposes unless its assets are dedicated to an exempt 
purpose,” and it will also fail the organizational test “if its articles or 
the law of the State in which it was created provide that its assets 
would, upon dissolution, be distributed to its members or 
shareholders.”147  Thus, it is standard practice, and the IRS, in its 
instructions to organizations completing Form 1023 and applying 
for recognition as a tax-exempt organization, counsels to include 
 
 145. See GUIDE SHEET, supra note 48, at 2; supra text accompanying notes 84–
86. 
 146. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
 147. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2011). 
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an acceptable “dissolution clause” in the articles or certificate of 
organization, providing that upon dissolution the assets of the 
organization will be distributed for one or more exempt purposes, 
or to one or more organizations that are 501(c)(3) organizations, 
or to state or local government. 
The laws governing organizations under which those forming 
a charitable nonprofit historically have proceeded are consistent 
with these requirements of § 501(c)(3).  State nonprofit 
corporation laws, such as the MNCA, contain provisions that 
proscribe both distribution of earnings to private individuals and 
transfer of the assets of the organization upon dissolution to a 
purpose or organization other than one that would meet the 
requirements of § 501(c)(3).148  The Revised Uniform 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (“RUUNAA”) is to the 
same effect.  It prohibits an unincorporated nonprofit association 
from paying dividends or making distributions to a member or 
manager, and it provides that property neither needed for payment 
of debts nor subject to other instructions from the donor or in a 
trust document “be distributed . . . as required by law other than 
this [act] that requires assets of an association to be distributed to 
another person with similar nonprofit purposes.”149  With the 
doctrine of cy pres, trust law is the same.  Where it “becomes 
unlawful, impossible, or impracticable to carry out” the designated 
charitable purpose, or where it would be “wasteful to apply all of 
the property to the designated purpose,” a court is directed to 
apply “the property or appropriate portion thereof to a charitable 
purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose.”150 
Four states have adopted nonprofit limited liability company 
acts that contain the required provisions151 and thus the LLC 
should be available for nonprofit organizations in those states no 
less than the nonprofit corporation, charitable trust, or 
unincorporated nonprofit association.  The acts address the 
organizational and operational tests the IRS has articulated, and in 
fact these statutes reflect the IRS Reference Guide Sheet instructions.152  
 
 148. MNCA §§ 6.40(a), 14.05 (2008). 
 149. RUUNAA §§ 26, 29 (2008). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
 151. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.015(18)–(19), 275.025, 275.520, 275.530, 
275.535, 275.540 (2011); MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.03 subdiv. 31a, 322B.975 (2011); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-01 to -09 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-702 to -704 
(2011).  
 152. See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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The North Dakota Nonprofit Limited Liability Company Act states 
flatly, “An individual may not be a member of, or own any financial 
rights or governance rights in, a nonprofit limited liability 
company.”153  In a similar vein, the Kentucky Nonprofit Limited 
Liability Companies Act provides, “A nonprofit limited liability 
company shall not have or issue membership interests in the 
limited liability company, and no distribution shall be paid, and no 
part of the income or profit of the limited liability company shall 
be distributed to its members or managers.”154  The Tennessee 
Nonprofit Limited Liability Companies Act envisions and is limited 
to the situation of a single-member nonprofit LLC where the sole 
member is a nonprofit corporation.155  Minnesota incorporates 
formation of a nonprofit LLC into its general limited liability 
company act and has a separate section stating the non-distribution 
constraint and limitation on distribution of assets on dissolution, 
and incorporating provisions that would apply to a nonprofit 
corporation (e.g., provisions addressing conflicts of interest).156 
Most states, however, have not adopted separate acts or 
 
 153. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-36-05.  It does not, however, limit membership 
to 501(c)(3) organizations or governmental entities or units, as the Instructions 
do.  See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47, at 3.  One or more 501(c)(3) 
organizations could utilize the statute to form a tax-exempt nonprofit LLC, and 
non-501(c)(3) organizations could presumably utilize the statute to form an LLC 
that would seek exempt status under a provision of § 501(c) other than (c)(3).  
Organizers have formed eight nonprofit LLCs under the North Dakota Nonprofit 
LLC Act.  E-mail from Clara M. Jenkins, Dir., Bus. Sys. & Programs, Office of N.D. 
Sec’y of State, to author (Aug. 16, 2011) (on file with author). 
 154. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.520(1).  In truth, this seems to be an anomalous 
provision because the Act otherwise defines a limited liability company as one 
“formed under this chapter having one (1) or more members.”  Id. § 275.015(11).  
Nonetheless, the Office of the Kentucky Secretary of State reports that 303 
nonprofit LLCs have been formed in Kentucky.  E-mail from J. Allen Eskridge, III, 
Ky. Assistant Sec’y of State, to Tom E. Rutledge, Member, Stoll Keenon Ogden 
PLLC (Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with author). 
 155. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-702(3), 48-101-704.  The Tennessee Act 
authorizes an existing nonprofit corporation to form a nonprofit limited liability 
company “[w]hose sole member is a nonprofit corporation” and which therefore 
will be “disregarded as an entity for federal income tax purposes.”  Id. § 48-101-
702(3).  An LLC that is a disregarded entity under the “check-the-box” regulations 
does not need to file a Form 1023 and seek recognition as a tax-exempt entity.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 44–48.  At the same time, the LLC would be a 
separate entity for liability purposes and would thus shield the parent from 
liabilities arising out of activities of the LLC or its ownership of property.  Id.  See 
generally James M. McCarten & Kevin N. Perkey, Tennessee Nonprofit LLCs—A New 
Option for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 3 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 15 (2001) 
(discussing the nonprofit LLC option available to tax-exempt organizations). 
 156. MINN. STAT. § 322B.975 (2011). 
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provisions concerning nonprofit LLCs and instead have provisions 
like those found in RULLCA.157  Specifically, RULLCA envisions 
individuals as members who make contributions that are not 
dedicated to exempt purposes, and who have management rights 
giving them control over those assets.158  Other than insolvency,159 
there is no constraint on distributions to members, and instead 
RULLCA explicitly authorizes the making of distributions of 
earnings or assets to members before dissolution of the LLC.160  
Nor does RULLCA contain language requiring distribution of 
assets on dissolution to a 501(c)(3) organization or otherwise for 
exempt purposes in the event the LLC was formed as a nonprofit.  
Instead, like other state LLC statutes, RULLCA provides for 
distribution of assets to the members after obligations to 
creditors—including members who are creditors—are 
discharged.161  State LLC statutes, therefore, do not contain the 
protections for charitable assets that are found in nonprofit 
corporation statutes, the RUUNAA, trust law, or state nonprofit 
limited liability company acts as discussed above.  It would seem too 
plain for words that LLCs formed under these state statutes would 
fail the “organizational test” and the “operational test” of § 
501(c)(3). 
Yet the LLC remains “a creature of contract,” and RULLCA’s 
provisions on distributions—either during the conduct of the 
LLC’s business and affairs or upon dissolution—are in fact default 
provisions that may be varied by agreement.162  Accordingly, there 
is nothing in state law that would preclude persons forming a 
nonprofit LLC from varying these default provisions and 
incorporating in both the articles of organization and the 
 
 157. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 29-801 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-101 (2011); 
IOWA CODE § 489.101 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-101 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
48-3-101 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-101 (2011). 
 158. See RULLCA §§ 401–02, 407 (2006). 
 159. Id. § 405. 
 160. Id. § 404.  RULLCA does not have a provision on allocation of profits and 
losses, but other states do.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-503 (2011). 
 161. RULLCA § 708; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804. 
 162. RULLCA §§ 110, 404, 708.  Section 110 provides that the operating 
agreement governs the relations among the members and between the members 
and the LLC and also the activities of the company and the conduct of those 
activities.  Id. § 110 (a)(1)–(3).  The Act only governs “[t]o the extent the 
operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter.”  Id. § 110 (b).  
Moreover, while the Act states certain provisions that the operating agreement 
may not vary, none of the mentioned provisions in the text are among them.  See 
id. § 110 (c)(1)–(11). 
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operating agreement standard provisions of the sort that a 
practitioner would unfailingly include in the articles and bylaws of 
a nonprofit corporation in preparation for seeking recognition as a 
tax-exempt nonprofit organization and that are in fact generally 
provided for by statute.  Thus, arguably the articles and operating 
agreement of the nonprofit LLC would satisfy the organizational 
test, and assuming compliance with the articles and the operating 
agreement, the operational test should be met, too. 
Would the organizational documents be “consistent with state 
LLC laws,” however, and be “enforceable in law and equity,” as the 
IRS has instructed that applicants should be able to show?163  Since 
the provisions in the statute regarding distributions of earnings and 
assets and control over assets are default provisions that may be 
varied and thus displaced in the articles and operating agreement, 
they would seem to be consistent with state law in the sense that 
state law is not contravened by them.164  But would the provisions 
precluding distribution of earnings to members or private 
individuals and dictating distribution of assets on dissolution to tax-
exempt purposes or organizations be enforceable?  What would 
prevent the governing board from amending the organizational 
documents, as LLC legislation allows,165 to become a for-profit 
entity and secure the earnings and assets for themselves? 
One response is that the governing board members owe a duty 
of loyalty to the nonprofit limited liability company, including for 
this purpose surely a duty of obedience to the purposes articulated 
in organizational documents—and if not to the specific purposes 
articulated in the original documents perhaps years ago166—then at 
least to tax-exempt purposes and the preservation of the company’s 
qualification as a tax-exempt organization.  One question to be 
asked is, who would enforce that duty?167  Is there a way to prohibit 
 
 163. See GUIDE SHEET INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 47; see supra text accompanying 
note 50 (specifically, the twelfth condition). 
 164. See RULLCA § 708 (b)–(d) cmt. (stating that the provisions provide 
“default rules” although they are subject to the provisions on “charging orders”); 
id. § 503 (explaining and defining “charging orders”). 
 165. See id. §§ 110(a)(4), 407(b)(5), (c)(4)(D). 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 139–43. 
 167. The problem of who will enforce this duty is a question that needs to be 
addressed, because neither donors, nor beneficiaries, nor members of the 
community or the public have standing to sue for breach of governing board 
members’ duties in regard to charitable assets.  See infra Part III.E.; FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 238 (“The general rule . . . remains that, absent a 
statutory right, there is no private enforcement of a charitable trust, a nonprofit 
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amendment of the organizational documents, at least in this 
fashion, without notice to state authorities and the opportunity to 
resist?  Kentucky does just that.168  It requires that anyone seeking 
to amend the articles to eliminate nonprofit status and nonprofit 
purpose give ten days’ notice to the Attorney General; given notice, 
the Attorney General could seek injunctive relief to ensure 
protection of charitable assets.169  Most states, however, do not have 
such a provision in their LLC statutes.170  A second response would 
come from the IRS itself.  Any such change in the articles and 
operating agreement eliminating nonprofit purpose would be 
cause for revocation of tax-exempt status, even retroactively.171  Yet 
that would not preclude the governing board from doing so under 
state law, and circumstances in which it would be worth the while of 
the governing board members are readily imaginable.172 
Still another possibility would be for the articles of 
organization and the operating agreement to contain a clause 
precluding them from being amended to eliminate the nonprofit 
purpose of the company without notice to or the approval of a 
third person, for example, the Attorney General or the appropriate 
court.  That seems to be the intended effect of the Kentucky 
provision.  Similarly, while some states’ nonprofit corporation laws 
do not require the board to give notice to the Attorney General or 
seek court approval where the board seeks to amend the articles to 
modify the nonprofit purpose,173 where the board proposes to take 
 
trust, or a nonprofit corporation.”). 
 168. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6) (2011) (“If the limited liability company 
is a nonprofit limited liability company, then the articles of organization shall state 
that fact and its nonprofit purpose.  This provision of the articles of organization 
shall not be removed from the articles of organization without written notice to 
the Attorney General of Kentucky given not less than ten (10) business days prior 
to the filing of the amendment.”).  The same result would likely occur in 
Minnesota.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.811, 317A.813, 322B.975(6) (2011). 
 169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6). 
 170. The states which have adopted nonprofit limited liability company 
legislation have such provisions.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6); MINN. 
STAT. §§ 317A.811, 322B.975(6); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-06, 10-33-102 (2011); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-707 (2011). But they are the exception and not the 
rule. 
 171. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200842047 (Oct. 17, 2008). 
 172. An example of such a situation would be where the amount that 
individuals would have to pay as a result of retroactive revocation of tax-exempt 
status and consequent imposition of personal taxes would be substantially less than 
the profits they would earn and appreciation that might occur if they converted to 
a for-profit entity, for example, in the health care field. 
 173. MNCA § 10.05 (2008).  The position taken in the ALI’s Principles of the 
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action that would eliminate the entity’s nonprofit purpose 
altogether and convert it to a for-profit entity,174 notice to the 
Attorney General and authorization from the appropriate court is 
generally required.175  RULLCA offers a solution along the lines 
suggested by the Kentucky Nonprofit LLC Act and state nonprofit 
corporation law.  It authorizes the operating agreement to “specify 
that its amendment requires the approval of a person that is not a 
party to the operating agreement or the satisfaction of a 
condition,”176 which could be the Attorney General or the 
appropriate court.  It could be argued that giving “approval” 
authority for such an amendment to the Attorney General would 
inappropriately make the Attorney General “a ‘super’ member of 
the board,” which is not the Attorney General’s role.177  Oversight 
and prevention of wrongdoing by nonprofits’ boards is the 
Attorney General’s role.  However, the issue here—whether or not 
to approve amendment of the articles and operating agreement 
essentially to authorize conversion of a 501(c)(3) nonprofit to a 
for-profit entity, leading to distribution of earnings and diversion of 
charitable assets in contravention of the nondistribution constraint 
that identifies the entity as a nonprofit—is not simply one of 
amending the LLC’s purposes to reflect evolution of a nonprofit 
purpose and its adaptation to the times.178  The issue is whether 
assets dedicated to the public interest will remain so.  That calls for 
a provision placing amendment beyond the governing board’s 
 
Law of Nonprofit Organizations is that notice to the Attorney General of amendment 
to the articles is not required in the event the entity is a nonprofit corporation, but 
is required if the entity is a charitable trust.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT 
ORGS., supra note 26, §§ 230, 240. 
 174. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.025(6); MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.811, 
322B.975; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-36-06, 10-33-102. 
 175. E.g., MNCA §§ 9.03(b), 9.30(a), (c).  The Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act, still the law in many states, explicitly provided that prior approval 
of the appropriate court was required, after a proceeding in which the Attorney 
General had been given written notice, in the event of a merger of a public benefit 
corporation with any entity other than another public benefit corporation.  
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.02 (2002). 
 176. RULLCA § 112(a) (2006).  Similarly, section 10.05 of the MNCA provides 
that the board of directors may amend the articles of a nonmembership 
corporation—which a 501(c)(3) nonprofit would be—but an amendment must 
also be approved “by a designated body whose approval is required by the articles 
of incorporation or bylaws.”  MNCA § 10.05(1). This is the principle at work in 
RULLCA § 112. 
 177. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity 
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 938, 976 (2004). 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 139–43. 
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control and requiring review by the Attorney General and the 
Attorney General’s approval, or a court’s.  RULLCA section 112 
would authorize that option. 
If this option were pursued, persons seeking to form a 
nonprofit LLC could include a provision in the articles and 
operating agreement specifying that neither the articles nor the 
operating agreement could be amended without the approval of 
the Attorney General or the appropriate court.  That kind of clause 
should be enforceable and prevent amendment of the documents 
and distribution of the LLC’s earnings and assets contrary to 
501(c)(3) and the requirements of the IRS. 
A problem would be that some Attorneys General might not 
accept that role, and others might allocate or have available too few 
resources to fulfill it meaningfully for the IRS’s purposes.179  More 
basically, however, even if the IRS could be persuaded through one 
or more of these means that the organizational and operational 
tests were satisfied, intervention of the Attorney General that is only 
available when amendment of the articles or operating agreement 
is sought would not provide the kind of oversight or protection of 
charitable purpose and charitable assets in other contexts to assure 
the IRS that tax-exempt purposes will not be compromised.  What 
protection of the nonprofit’s purposes and assets is available where 
a nonprofit LLC may be formed under general limited liability 
company legislation? 
E. Do State LLC Acts Allowing Formation of a Nonprofit LLC Offer 
Necessary Protection of Charitable Assets? 
The assets of a charitable nonprofit organization are dedicated 
to public use and for the benefit of the community.  That is the 
 
 179. See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 
701, 703 (2008).  In a survey to the states asking, among other things, how many 
attorneys were dedicated to charity oversight, if any, seventy-four percent of the 
states responding reported that they had one or no full-time attorneys assigned to 
nonprofit oversight (seventeen states reported none).  Garry W. Jenkins, 
Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 
1113, 1128–29 tbl.1 (2007).  On the willingness of Attorneys General to accept 
regulatory roles, “an investigation by the staff of the Pennsylvania Assembly into 
the spectacular collapse of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy found that 
the failings of the Attorney General’s office were not so much the fault of 
inadequate staffing as deference to a well-connected, charismatic founder.”  
Brody, supra note 177, at 949. 
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very purpose of the nondistribution constraint under state law180 
and the requirement in § 501(c)(3): “no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.”  That is why the IRS insists upon a dissolution clause in 
the articles of organization, without which the application for 
recognition as a tax-exempt organization will be denied because it 
will fail the organizational test.181  A nonprofit organization will fail 
the organizational and operational tests “unless it serves a public 
rather than a private interest.”182  In short, these are organizations 
intended to benefit the public. 
The public therefore has a strong interest in the assets of a 
nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization being effectively devoted to the 
organization’s exempt purposes, and not diverted, misapplied, or 
wasted.  That is certainly true where the nonprofit receives gifts or 
grants from donors who contribute or make grants or buy services 
from nonprofits with an expectation that revenues generated will 
be devoted to exempt purposes and not misappropriated or 
diverted.  Accordingly, accountability of those governing the 
nonprofit, enforcement of their duties, and protection of 
charitable assets are matters of real importance.  No individual 
member of the community or the public, however, nor even a 
donor or beneficiary, generally has standing to sue to prevent 
breach or to enforce duties and obtain a remedy for breach.183  Yet, 
there must be some means by which to protect against breach of 
fiduciary duties.184 
 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18. 
 181. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); I.R.S. FORM 1023, supra note 53, at Part III.   
 182. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011). 
 183. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 231–38. There are limited 
exceptions, but “[t]he general rule . . . remains that, absent a statutory right, there 
is no private enforcement of a charitable trust, a nonprofit trust, or a nonprofit 
corporation.”  Id. at 238. 
 184. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 160 (2010), 
where, in commenting upon the possibility of no-owner and nonprofit firms, 
including nonprofit LLCs, the author states, “Without economic owners who have 
incentives to protect their interests in profits, the firm also would need devices to 
protect donors from misconduct by managers.  That is why nonprofit corporations 
have to form under special statutory provisions and are subject to special state 
supervision.”  See also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT introductory cmt., at 
xxvi–xxvii (1987): 
  Since members of public benefit corporations have no economic 
interest in their corporations, they have no personal economic incentive 
to monitor corporate activities and prevent abuses.  Many public benefit 
corporations do not even have members.  While contributors have an 
incentive to monitor corporate activities, they may have no practical 
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It is the state Attorney General to whom state law generally 
assigns the responsibility for oversight of nonprofit organizations.185  
Thirty-seven states provide by statute for the Attorney General to 
have oversight responsibility for charitable assets.186  The specific 
powers vested in the Attorney General vary but typically require 
that notice be given to the Attorney General of certain critical 
events, especially ones such as dissolution or the transfer of all or 
substantially all assets,187 and in many cases amendment of the 
organization’s purposes where property is held in trust.188  The 
Attorney General may sue for injunctive relief and to remove 
directors or trustees who have violated their duties of care or 
loyalty.189  While the principle of oversight responsibility and 
authority of the Attorney General has historically been expressed in 
nonprofit corporation statutes, in those states that have specifically 
authorized nonprofit limited liability companies, the legislation has 
given the Attorney General the same authority with respect to LLCs 
as is authorized for nonprofit corporations.190  As Evelyn Brody, 
Reporter for the ALI’s project on Principles of the Law of Nonprofit 
Organizations has expressed it, the Attorney General’s role is not 
decision making but is “to provide oversight of the charitable 
sector,” “to guard against charity fiduciaries’ wrongdoing,” and “to 
seek to correct breaches of fiduciary duty that have not otherwise 
been remedied by the board.”191  For the IRS, which counts on 
continuing satisfaction of the organizational and operational tests 
and enforcement of organizational documents, and the state law 
with which those documents must be consistent,192 the 
accountability provided by the Attorney General has to be regarded 
 
means of doing so. . . .  
  The Revised Act  . . . [filled] this void by statutorily clarifying existing 
common law and statutory authority of the attorney general. 
 185. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 301–
06 (2004). 
 186. Id. at 306. 
 187. E.g., MNCA §§ 12.03(a)–(b), 14.05(c)–(d) (2008). 
 188. MNCA § 10.09. 
 189. E.g., MNCA § 1.51; MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.975 subdiv. 6, 317A.811–.813 
(2011); Committee to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos, available at, https://folio 
.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/502/THE%20COMMITTEE%20TO%20SA
VE%20ADELPHI.pdf?sequence=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 190. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.025(6), 275.540 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 
322B.975 subdiv. 6 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-36-06 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-101-705(d) (2011).  
 191. See Brody, supra note 177, at 1034. 
 192. See supra notes 56–57, 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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as essential to tax-exempt status of the nonprofit organization. 
Most state statutes that would allow a limited liability company 
to be formed for any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for 
profit, do not contain provisions giving the Attorney General the 
authority that the Attorney General has with respect to nonprofit 
corporations.  RULLCA contains none, for the decision was made 
early in the revision process to leave protective provisions to other 
law.  That appears to be one reason why Nebraska, which adopted 
RULLCA, struck the language “regardless of whether for profit,” 
leaving section 104(b) to say only that a limited liability company 
could be formed for “any lawful purpose.”193 
Assuming that the IRS would otherwise be willing to move 
beyond the position it stated in its Limited Liability Company Reference 
Guide Sheet and allow individuals to form a tax-exempt nonprofit 
LLC much as they could form a nonprofit corporation, is this 
absence of protective provisions likely to be fatal to recognition as 
tax-exempt?  In truth, the absence of such provisions is not limited 
to RULLCA and like LLC legislation.  The most recent edition of 
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act does not require, and 
instead leaves optional, provisions relating to the role of the 
Attorney General: 
The decision of the drafting committee to mark as 
optional the provisions relating to the role of the attorney 
general was based on the fact that charitable 
organizations may not necessarily be structured as a 
corporation, with the result that supervisory provisions for 
them might be inadvertently omitted from a state’s 
statutory scheme.  Charities may be organized as 
unincorporated nonprofit associations or, under the law 
of some states, as limited liability companies, and to cover 
some other forms of entities requires a statute with 
broader scope.194 
The choice to bracket and thus make optional the provisions 
relating to the Attorney General has been prominently criticized, 
for example, for failing to appreciate the significance of adhering 
to state law to be in compliance with federal tax law.195  Moreover, 
 
 193. E-mail from Julie Karavas, Chair of the Neb. Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Section, 
to the author (on file with author).   
 194. MNCA Foreword, at xxiii (2008). 
 195. Evelyn Brody & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Draft Model Nonprofit Act 
Revision Needs Coordination with Tax Code, 119 TAX NOTES 617 (2008). 
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while some states do permit nonprofit limited liability companies to 
be formed under their LLC acts, some of those states specifically 
incorporate by reference into their LLC legislation provisions 
regarding the role of the Attorney General found in the nonprofit 
corporation statutes; and for those that do not, they only raise the 
question whether the state law provides an adequate framework on 
which recognition of the organization formed under that law as 
tax-exempt can rest.  Yet it is in fact true that unincorporated 
nonprofit association statutes have not articulated a role for the 
Attorney General,196 and it should also be noted that not all states’ 
nonprofit corporation statutes articulate a role for the Attorney 
General as described above.197  “[T]o cover some other forms of 
entities,” as the Foreword to the third edition of the MNCA quoted 
above candidly states, there should be “a statute with broader 
scope.”198 
The Uniform Laws Commission completed work on and 
approved such a law in the summer of 2011.  It is the Model 
Protection of Charitable Assets Act.199  While extended discussion 
and analysis of this Act is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
relevant that the Act is addressed to the protection of charitable 
assets held by a person, regardless of the form of entity,200 so that it 
would apply where charitable assets were held by a nonprofit 
 
 196. Neither the Uniform Laws Commission’s Uniform Unincorporated 
Nonprofit Association Act—adopted in twelve jurisdictions—nor its Revised 
Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act—adopted in four jurisdictions (two of 
which adopted the 1996 Act)—includes a provision stating the Attorney General’s 
role with respect to the nonprofit.  See RUUNAA (2008); UNIF. UNINCORPORATED 
NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT (1994). 
 197. Iowa’s nonprofit corporation statute was amended in 2004 to address 
mergers of a nonprofit corporation with or into any one or more business 
corporations or nonprofit corporations or limited liability companies.  IOWA CODE 
§ 504.1101(1) (2011).  Prior approval of the district court is required if a public 
benefit corporation will merge with an entity other than a public benefit 
corporation, IOWA CODE § 490.1102–1103, but Iowa law does not provide for 
notice to, or a role for, the Attorney General.  The Iowa Attorney General may, 
however, have authority to intervene.  See id. § 13.2(b) (authorizing Attorney 
General to prosecute and defend in any court or tribunal “in which the state may 
be a party or interested, when, in the attorney general’s judgment, the interest of the state 
requires such action” (emphasis added)). 
 198. MNCA Foreword, at xxiii. 
 199. MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011).  The author was a 
member of the Drafting Committee for this Model Act. 
 200. Id. § 2(1)–(2); MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT Prefatory Note 
(2011) (Annual Meeting Draft approved by the ULC but not yet finalized) (on file 
with the author). 
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corporation; a charitable trust; an unincorporated nonprofit 
association; a limited liability company; or, for that matter, a for-
profit corporation if the assets held were indeed “charitable assets.”  
In addition, the Act explicitly states, “The [Attorney General] shall 
represent the public interest in the protection of charitable assets,” 
and it provides the Attorney General with authority to seek to 
prevent or to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty that would result 
or have resulted in diversion, misapplication, or waste of charitable 
assets.201  It would fill the gap noted above in RULLCA and in other 
state laws under which a nonprofit organization might be 
organized.  Thus, if a nonprofit LLC were to be organized in a state 
which adopted legislation like the Model Protection of Charitable 
Assets Act, the reservation or objection that the state LLC law lacks 
necessary protection for charitable assets would be answered, and a 
remaining obstacle to recognition of the LLC as a tax-exempt 
organization would be overcome. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Nonprofit limited liability companies are presently being 
organized and serve important purposes in the nonprofit world as 
joint ventures involving a 501(c)(3) organization and as 
subsidiaries where the LLC’s sole member is a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) 
organization.202  Its use as a single member LLC formed by a parent 
501(c)(3) particularly offers advantages in that the LLC is a 
disregarded entity and does not have to file its own Form 1023 or 
Form 990, yet limits the exposure of the parent to liability.203 
Beyond these contexts, use of the LLC to secure recognition as 
a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization is presently not a realistic 
choice under most states’ LLC laws.204  The evolution of the LLC 
suggests that will change.  A strong source of the LLC’s appeal, 
whether it is a nonprofit entity or a for-profit entity, is its flexibility 
and the tailoring that is possible because it is a creature of 
contract.205  That “inherent plasticity,” as one author has described 
it, is the LLC’s single theory that explains its flexibility and its 
evolving adaptability to situations beyond those originally 
 
 201. MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 3(a)(2)–(3) (2011). 
 202. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra Part III.D. 
 205. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
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conceived for it.206  Organizers are better able to structure their 
arrangement and operate to further their mission and reach goals.  
This flexibility and adaptability would make the limited liability 
company a very valuable choice of form for numerous small- to 
medium-sized 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations if state and 
federal law recognized it as such.  Nearly seventy-five percent of 
reporting 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations—representing more 
than 250,000 public charities—have budgets of less than $500,000 a 
year.207 
As a practical matter, however, the IRS appears to limit the use 
of LLCs to situations where one or more members is a 501(c)(3) 
organization and none of the members is an individual.208  
Challenging the IRS on this point may not be worth the expense, 
time, and effort that would be entailed, especially because the 
nonprofit corporation is a readily available choice whose 
requirements, formalities, and procedures conform to regulatory 
requirements—not by accident, of course. 
But the IRS’s position in this regard can be readily explained 
on the basis of LLC law at the time it communicated its twelve 
conditions and issued its Reference Guide Sheet and Instructions.  
Historically, LLCs could only be formed for a business purpose; the 
law provided for individual members who made contributions and 
had contractual rights to share in profits, receive distributions, 
control assets, and have assets distributed to them on dissolution 
after creditors were paid.209  Nothing could be farther from the 
nondistribution constraint, prohibition of inurement and private 
benefit, and requirement that assets on dissolution be transferred 
only for public, exempt purposes, or to other 501(c)(3) entities, or 
to government. 
Yet limited liability company legislation has evolved since that 
time, and the “inherent plasticity” with which it imbues the LLC 
makes it possible to consider an LLC as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
 
 206. Thomas Earl Geu, A Single Theory of Limited Liability Companies: An 
Evolutionary Analysis, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 507, 551 (2009). 
 207. Wing et al., supra note 5, at 3 fig.1.  “Reporting” 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations are those that collected more than $25,000 in gross receipts and 
filed a Form 990 with the IRS.  According to this study by the Urban Institute’s 
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, there were more than 600,000 public 
charities that were not reporting nonprofit organizations.  In consequence, the 
number of “small” 501(c)(3) organizations is far greater than the 250,000 
reporting pubic charities.  Id. at 2. 
 208. See supra note 49. 
 209. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
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organization.  LLC laws increasingly allow an LLC to be organized 
for any lawful purpose, “regardless of whether for profit.”210  
Management may be structured as members or organizers choose, 
perhaps preferably as manager-managed with a “board of 
managers,” but there must and will be a “governing body” that can 
operate the LLC in compliance with federal tax law and state LLC 
law.211  The fiduciary duties of managers of LLCs under state law 
could fully meet the demands of the IRS for good governance in 
nonprofits. 
That is not to say that there are not serious issues that need to 
be addressed.  The default provisions of almost all LLC statutes 
assume that inurement and distribution of earnings and assets will 
occur.212  The distribution of earnings and assets to members as 
owners is irreconcilable with 501(c)(3) and would have to be 
addressed in the articles and in the operating agreement.213  They 
can be.  LLC provisions in these respects are default provisions.214  
Moreover, since LLC legislation does not presently contain the 
constraints imposed by nonprofit corporation law,215 some way 
would have to be found to ensure that the governing board could 
not simply amend these to circumvent the constraints.  One way 
that some states have selected is simply to adopt nonprofit LLC acts 
that contain the necessary provisions.216  Another way that this 
article suggests is through provisions in the articles and the 
operating agreement prohibiting amendment of either of them 
without the approval of a third party acceptable to the IRS, for 
example, the Attorney General.217  Similar provisions are lawful and 
enforceable in other contexts and should be enforceable with 
respect to LLCs if states were to adopt RULLCA or amend their 
LLC acts to include a provision like RULLCA section 112.218  An 
additional, serious issue that impedes recognition of nonprofit 
LLCs as tax-exempt is the absence of provisions regarding the 
Attorney General’s role from most state LLC statutes.219  But that, 
 
 210. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 146–47, 162–64 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 157–62 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 157–78 and accompanying text. 
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too, may be addressed.  Four states have done so in separate 
nonprofit limited liability company legislation, and certainly this 
concern would be addressed if states adopted the Model Protection 
of Charitable Assets Act.220 
Until the changes suggested above occur, other than in the 
situations the IRS currently approves, the choice to organize a 
nonprofit that can secure recognition as tax-exempt under § 
501(c)(3) as an LLC is unlikely and will be an uphill battle 
probably not worth pressing.  Consideration of an LLC in other 
than presently sanctioned contexts, however, reveals changes in the 
law that some states have made and responsive structuring in 
practice that can readily be accomplished.  Doing so would bring 
the structural and operational advantages of the LLC to the 
nonprofit sector—a sector of dynamic growth—and that prospect 
seems certain to cause further consideration of what needs to be 




 220. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text. 
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